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ABSTRACT 
This study investigated the relationship between responsibility 
ascriptions and teacher evaluations of pupils' achievements, emphasizing 
the examination of differential intention and effort effects. The pur-
pose of this study was to clarify distinctions between information 
about "intention" and information about "effort" that are suggested by 
the underlying theory of attribution but have been neglected in prior 
experimental tests of the theory. An additional purpose of the study 
was an examination of the theoretical assumption that ascriptions of 
responsibility mediate evaluative judgments. 
It was hypothesized that both situational and motivational cues 
• 
would affect evaluative judgments. It was predicted that locus of out-
come consequence would affect evaluations such that positive evaluations 
for success and negative evaluations for failure would be intensified 
when the outcome had effects for others as well as for the stud2nt 
performing the action. On the basis of theoretical propositions it was 
predicted that intention cues and effort cues would have different 
effects on evaluations. It was also hypothesized that motivational 
cues would affect responsibility ascriptions, and that there would be a 
positive relationship between responsibility ascriptions and evaluations. 
Packets of stories were presented to 72 teachers of grades three 
through six. Half of the subjects received 18 stories with an indivi-
dual outcome consequence and half received 18 with a group outcome 
consequence. Half of the sucjects in each situation first made 
evaluations of and then determined personal responsibility of the 
students in each of the stories, while half of the subjects completed 
the tasks in the reverse order. Stories varied on two motivational 
cues, intention (high, average, low) and effort (high, average, low), 
and outcome (pass, fail). Evaluations were made according to an eleven 
point scale, ranging from 5 (high positive) to -5 (high negative); 
responsibility ratings were made on a scale from 1 (not at all responsi-
ble) to 5 (completely responsible). 
Previous findings regarding locus of outcome consequence were 
not supported. Evaluative judgments were significantly affected by 
intention, effort, and outcome, with interactions found between inten-
tion x outcome and between effort x outcome, and with different patterns 
apparent for intention effects than for effort effects. Effects of 
effort on evaluation were magnified when evaluations were obtained 
after responsibility was overtly ascribed. Responsibility ascriptions 
were significantly affected by outcome and by motivational cues, with 
interactions between outcome x intention and outcome x effort. No 
significant correlations were found within conditions between evalua-
tions and responsibility ratings, but the patterns of results for the 
two measures were highly similar. 
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I. -INTRODUCTION 
Within the last several decades a great deal of work in 
psychology has been directed towards a reaffirmation that cognitive 
processes play an important role in determining or directing human 
behavior. Bolles (1974), for example notes that although psychology has 
always had some type of cognitive base, formalized cognitive approaches 
have only recently gained respect within the realm of "scientific" 
psychological theory. Mischel (1974) discusses an important example of 
the relative neglect of cognitive factors in psychological theory and 
research. He notes that while there has been strong theoretical 
significance attributed to the function of rewards, there is a blatant 
lack of understanding as to how cognitive representations of rewards 
may be involved in the regulation of complex hehaviors. 
Cognitive models of psychology, because of their complex proper-
ties, facilitate an understanding of the richness of human behavior. 
These models provide a means for analyzing the intricate mechanisms by 
which behavior is controlled. Cognitive theorists address the complexi-
ties of behavior by focusing on the informational or cue value of 
stimuli. Unlike more mechanistic approach.es, cognitive theories do not 
define stimuli as goading the organism. Instead, stimuli are viewed as 
a source of information from w~ich meaning can be extracted about the 
external physical world (Weiner, 1972). The task of cognitive theorists 
is, therefore, to provide a logical, systematic explanation of how 
stimulus cues are utilized and how they mediate behavioral responses. 
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Attribution Theory 
Attribution theory is a cognitive model which is primarily con-
cerned with the development and utilization of causal rule systems as an 
inherent activity of human beings. One of the basic assumptions of 
attribution theory is that man is motivated to gain cognitive mastery 
over his environment /(Kelley, 1967). Within this theoretical framework, 
man is viewed not merely as a consumer of information but as an active 
processor of information. / Bolles (1974), for example, proposes that 
each of us organizes and makes cognitive sense of information in order 
to make sense of ourselves and the world around us. Such organizational 
structures then play a mediational role in guiding or influencing 
behavior. Attribution theory proposes that people continually attempt 
to understand and control their phenomenological world by analyzing 
environmental cues, making inferences about the causes of events, and 
then responding to the world on the basis of these causal inferences 
(Jones & Nisbett, 1972; Kelley, 1972, 1972b; Weiner, 1974). Thus the 
attribution process enables one to explain, predict, and thereby control 
the world in which he lives by substituting stable inferred structures 
for observed flux (Jones & Goethals, 1972). 
The principles of attribution theory could be applied to a broad 
spectrum of environmental events such as the examination of naive causal 
beliefs about chemical activity, meteorology, physics, etc. For 
example, Heider and Simmel (1944) examined the importance of causal 
ascriptions in the organization and description of apparent relation-
ships among moving objects. However, attribution theory primarily 
focuses on naive social psychology, and examines the causal elements of 
interpersonal relationships (J ones , Kanouse, Nisbett, Valins & Weiner, 
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1972). For the most part, attribution theorists operating within the 
realm of social psychology develop paradigms for assessing the relation-
ship between perceived causes of an event and the evaluative judgments 
about the outcome of the event (Frieze & Weiner, 1971). In addition, 
attribution theorists examine the processes by which an individual 
selects from the many cues available those cues which are believed to be 
relevant to the causation of the event or action, and how based on this 
constellation of cues, an individual reaches a functional causal judg-
ment. 
A major basis for the classification of the phenomenal causes of 
events by attribution theorists is Reider's (1958) system. Within this 
model the phenomenal causes of success and failure are conceived to be 
based upon the perceived activity of certain personal (internal) factors 
and certain environmental (external) factors, each of which may be 
further subdivided into either dispositional (stable) or fluctuating 
(unstable) factors. Specifically, Heider proposed a "naive theory" of 
action in which one's judgments regarding the outcome of an event are 
based upon the analysis of two perceived supraordinate categorical fac-
tors: power and motivation. The power factor is the stable, dispositional 
factor and subsumed under it are those cues pertaining to an individual's 
ability or to the difficulty of the task to be completed, The motiva-
tional factor encompasses the unstable, fluctuating variables and 
includes those cues which indicate the individual's intention to act 
and his expenditure of effort in the specific situation. According to 
Heider, all of the above factors are combined additivel y as an indivi-
dual analyzes and responds to his social environment. Thus Reider's 
model for understanding social perception parallels many other cognitive 
models of behavior. There is a clear analogy between this power by 
motivation formula and the expectancy by value formula that underlies 
Tolman's (1932) theory, for example. 
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According to attribution theory, individuals ascribe causal 
responsibility for an outcome to one or more specific factors to the 
extent that they appear to be present when the effect is present and 
absent when the effect is absent (Kelley, 1967). Kelley likens causal 
ascription to the Analysis of Variance model of statistics which 
examines the covariation of an effect over situations, persons, time and 
modalities of action. By using consensus information and consistency 
infonia.tion, the individual gradually develops conceptions about the way 
in which certain kinds of causes interact to produce a specific effect. 
This relatively permanent relationship which the individual perceives 
between an observed event and its causes is referred to as a causal 
schema. Causal schemata enable a person to integrate and make use of 
information gathered from temporally and spatially distinct occasions 
(Kelley, 1972b). The schemata are the structural units or rule systems 
within which causal cognitions are organiz~d; and, as such, they are the 
roots of cognitive causal mediation. That is, the schemata or belief 
systems give meaning to a stimulus. And, subsequent responses to the 
stimulus are guided by intervening structures of thought (Weiner, 
Frieze, Kukla, Reed, Rest, & Rosenbaum, 1972). 
In summary, attribution theory, as derived from Heider' s '"naive 
theory", is d cognitive model of behavior wherein the perceived outcome 
of an event serves as a stimulus, and causal schemata are the 
intervening cognitions which rather than defining or regulating 
behavioral responses, serve as structures for appraisal. The 
differential allocation of causality results in different affective 
experiences, future expectations, and behaviors. Causal cognitions are 
functional in that they aid the individual in providing himself with a 
more predictable environment (Weiner, 1972). 
Achievement: Weiner's Model 
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Weiner has applied Attribution Theory to achievement motivation 
in a two part model (Kun & Weiner, 1973; Weiner, 1972, 1974b; Weiner, 
Frieze, Kukla, Reed, Rest, & Rosenbaur.i, 1972). The first aspect of this 
model involves a theory of how antecedent stimulus cues are integrated 
into cognitive structures, i.e. causal schemata. The second component 
of the model involves a theory of action and is primarily concerned with 
evaluating the laws or rule systems that relate thought to action. 
During the initial stage of the attribution process the indivi-
dual examines antecedent conditions of an event and makes inferences 
about its causation. According to Weiner, the perceived primary causes 
of an action or event, the power and motivation factors outlined by 
Heider, may be conceptualized within a two way classification scheme on 
the basis of stability and locus of control. Ability and task diffi-
culty, the indicators of power, are considered to be relatively stable 
while effort, an indicator of motivation, may vary over time. Ability 
and effort are presumed to be internal qualities that are under the 
control of the person. Task difficulty, on the other hand, is an 
environmental factor which is externally controlled. In addition, 
Weiner includes luck as a causal attribute, and he defines luck as an 
externally controlled unstable factor. 
On the basis of the causal cognitions arising from the initial 
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stage of the attribution process, the individual experiences affective 
reactions, e.g. pleasure/displeasure, pride/shame, etc., and expec-
tancies, e.g. anticipation of success or failure. These affective 
reactions and expectancies are considered to serve as a link between 
thought and action, and thereby influence the individual's overt 
response to the event. However, the rules by which affective responses 
are linked to causal attributions are not clearly defined. 
Antecedent Stimuli. According to Weiner's propositions, numerous 
stimuli are analyzed by an individual during the process of making 
causal inferences. This process is indeed a complex one in that 
ascriptions to causal factors are not made independently of one another 
or from mutually exclusive cues. Rather, many pieces of partly over-
lapping information are compared simultaneously in order for a func-
tional causal judgment to be reached. This theoretical framework has 
been supported by empirical evidence (Frieze & Weiner, 1971; Frieze, 
1976; Weiner, 1974b). A brief review of the current state of the model, 
is presented below. 
Inferences, about ability are based upon information about an 
individual's performance over time. For example, subjects who consis-
tently succeed at tasks which others tend to fail, subjects who show 
performance peaks, and subjects who show high initial performance are 
viewed as having high abilit y . 
Inferences about one's own effort are considered to be based upon 
proprioceptive feedback, or introspective knowledge. Inferences about 
another's effort are made by analogy from self ascription, from visible 
evidence ind i cating force of exer t ion, from verbal confirmation, or by 
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the covariation of ability and difficulty with the outcome of the event. 
For example, an individual who performs better than would be expected 
for someone of his ability at a task of a particular difficulty would 
be considered to have expended effort. 
Inferences about the difficulty of the task are seen to result 
from an examination of the length, complexity, and novelty of the task, 
or (alternatively) from normative data. Thus, a task that is long, 
complex or novel is generally considered more difficult that one that is 
short, simple, or similar to other tasks. In addition, a task which 
most people fail is considered difficult whereas one that most people 
pass is considered to be easy. 
Attributions to luck are considered as being derived from 
apparent randomness of outcome, independence of antecedents and conse-
quences, or disconfirmation of expected outcome. That is, if everything 
known about an individual in a given situation would lead one to expect 
a failure but the individual succeeds, the outcome may be considered to 
be the result of good luck. Conversely, failure in a situation that has 
an expectancy of success can be considered the result of bad luck. 
There are several points which do not fit neatly into Weiner's 
two way classification, thus indicating a need for further development 
of the model. For example, Frieze (1976) found that although task 
difficulty, ability, and effort were among the most frequently cited 
categories for explaining the results of an achievement related event, 
they were not used exclusively. A category of incentive er task impor-
tance was also found among the more frequent explanations. In addition, 
Frieze found a sub-class of causal categories such as mood, health, and 
home environment that were employed only as excuses for failure when 
success had been expected. There is an obvious need to examine a 
broader variety of causal cue categories. There is also a need to 
specify the covariation of such cues which leads to inferences of 
responsibility and causality. 
Consequences of Causal Attribution for One's Own Behavior 
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The general premise that causal inferences mediate an individual's 
interpretation of his own behavior and subsequent responses to environ-
mental events has been supported by a variety of empirical studies 
(e.g. Schacter & Singer, 1962; Lazarus, 1966; Valins, 1966; Nisbett & 
Valins, 1972). The attribution model proposed by Weiner suggests some 
specific ways in which the causal cognitions guide the manner in which 
an individual views and responds to the world around him and to his own 
role in events. When an outcome or event is attributed to stable fac-
tors such as ability or task difficulty the individual will come to 
expect a similar outcome in the future. Conversely, when an outcome or 
event is attributed to fluctuating cues such as effort or luck future 
outcome may be expected to differ (McMahan, 1973; Weiner, 1974c). 
Weiner (1974c) also suggests that attribution of outcome to internal 
factors of ability or effort will influence the individual's beliefs 
about whether the actor (including hi~self) was in control of or 
responsible for the outcome. In such a case the causal attribution 
would affect the individual's sense of pride or shame and would 
significantly affect the individual's affective reactions to the . outcome 
or his evaluation of it. On the other hand, a success or failure that 
is based upon external environmental factors is outside of the person's 
control (Cook, 1970; Weiner & Kukla, 1970; Weiner & Sierad, 1973). 
Thus, according to Weiner's model, it is the intervening constructs of 
causal responsibility and expectancy which actively link attributions 
of causality and evaluations of an event. 
Causal Attribution and 
Evaluative Judgments of Others 
In addressing the link between thought and action, attribution 
theorists suggest that causal ascriptions not only influence how the 
individual interprets his own behavior, but also influence how the 
individual perceives, organizes and responds to the behavior of others. 
Just as in the case of self analysis, an observer engaged in the analy-
sis of others will search the environment for cues that can shed light 
upon the reasons why an event occurred. 
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Heider (1958), the seminal theorist in this domain, hypothesizes 
that in a "naive analysis of action" (i.e. a layman trying to determine 
the causes of an event) outcome is perceived to be a function of the 
effective personal forces and the effective environmental forces. The 
individual observer must therefore gather information about both the 
actor and the environment as related to what Reider calls the power and 
motivation facets of the event. Heider notes that both power ("can") 
and motivation ("try") are inherent in the perception of every human 
action. He suggests that the task of the observer or the evaluator is 
to determine the valence and magnitude of each of these factors in order 
to reach a functional causal judgment and to make an evaluative judgment 
about the acceptability of the event. 
In making decisions about the power factor, the individual must 
determine whether, and to what degree, the event could be accomplished 
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or avoided, as the situation requires. In order to do this, the 
individual would have to take into account such cues as the inherent 
ability of the actor (.e.g intellectual capability), the actor's 
availability to perform (e.g. whether he was in the vicinity), and the 
nature of the task (e.g. whether it was humanly possible to accomplish). 
In making decisions about the motivation factor, the observor must 
determine · the valence and intensity of the actor's intent and effort. 
That is, the observor must assess the value which the individual places 
on performance (e.g. whether he wanted to perform the particular action) 
and the force of action (e.g. how hard he tried to accomplish the task). 
Most of the subsequent empirical work on attribution processes 
and their relation to evaluative judgments have incorporated components 
of Reider's power factor and motivational factor; but, these studies 
have neglected to include or . clearly represent all of the major aspects 
of Reider's system, and this has left noticeable gaps in our under-
standing of these phenomena. 
Of the two components in Reider's system, the power factor has 
been the more completely analyzed. Studies have examined the effects of 
an actor's ability and the effects of varying degrees of task difficulty 
(Frieze & Weiner, 1971; Kukla, 1972; Kun & Weiner, 1973; Weiner & Kukla, 
1970; Weiner & Peter, 1973). The results of these experiments show 
interesting but conflicting effects of the ability variable. In some 
instances low ability appeared to heighten positive evaluations for 
success while diminishing negative evaluation for failure, while in 
other cases low ability acted to merely reduce the range of feedback 
given, dL-ninishing both reward and punishment. Rest, Nierenberg, 
Weiner, and Reckhausen (1973) sought to clear up the discrepancies in 
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the ability data. The results of their investigation suggested that 
there is a difference between the informational cues presented by the 
experimenter and their interpretation by the subject. For example, 
ability did not produce a significant effect of its own but instead 
interacted with effort information. Reported levels of effort were 
perceived differently when in combination with varying levels of re-
ported ability and varying outcome. That is, an observor may discount 
or alter information presented because of a contrast set up on the basis 
of the covarying cues. As a result, a low ability person described as 
putting forth high effort may be considered by the observor as having 
expended more effort than his high ability high effort counterpart. 
Thus, the observor may believe that the low ability student who succeeds 
must be trying harder than the high ability student who succeeds at the 
same task, even though the message contains no indication of this. For 
this reason, care must be taken to control compensatory motivational 
attributions that are fostered by the within subjects experimental 
design typically employed in this research. 
Although there are some difficulties in the manner in which the 
power factor has been examined in previous research, it has been more 
completely addressed than its companion factor, motivation. Weiner 
(1974) discussed both the importance and the relative neglect of 
motivational variables in several areas of psychological research, and 
noted that psychology has tended to focus on the measurement of ability 
to perfcrm in school situations while ignoring the more subjective 
determinants of achievement. Specificall y , Weiner was referring to the 
thrust toward academic readiness programs and the trend toward fostering 
intellectual growth rather than enhancing a positive motivational 
orientation in young children, but his points can be applied to basic 
research as well as to educational applications. 
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Although Weiner was concerned about the relative neglect of 
motivational factors, he too has fallen into the trap of putting moti-
vational aspects of behavior into a somewhat secondary position. For 
example, while he acknowledged suggestions by Rosenbaum (1972) that 
intentionality may be an important dimension of causal attribution, he 
indicated that the complexities arising from the incorporation of this 
dimension into the attribution model may be too difficult to assimilate 
(Weiner, 1974b). Weiner has included consideration of motivation in 
terms of effort in his model but has consistently shied away from an 
analysis of intent. This avoidance of intent as a stimulus cue in 
causal attribution and evaluative judgments is clearly apparent in his 
summaries of Reider's model. Heider (1958) wrote at length about the 
role of intentionality cues in the "naive analysis of action" yet Weiner 
stated that Reider's model stresses the importance of only ability, 
effort, task difficulty, and luck. 
Ryan (1970) pointed out that intention is a generally neglected 
concept throughout contemporary theories of motivation and is considered, 
for the most part, to be of questionable legitimacy. It is therefore 
understandable that intention has also been ignored by attribution 
theorists. It appears that one of the problems with the concept of 
intention is its intangibility. Unlike muscular movements or a force of 
exertion, it is difficult to measure and perhaps unable to be observed 
easily. Bolles (1974) notes that although we can recognize motives in 
the behavior of others, this perception of motive is subtle and we 
rarely talk explicitly about it. Intentionality is difficult to pin 
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down because it seems to be totally internal to the individual possess-
ing it. However, the fact that intention is difficult to circumscribe 
should not negate its existence and its potential effect. As Ryan 
(1970) noted, " .•. values, motives, intentions, images, or other 
'mental events' are events in the same organism in which we measure 
neural activity .•. both kinds of events are indicators of the total 
activity of the single organism. (p .12)" 
The concept of intention has been excluded from psychological 
theories because it is suspect in the sense of being subjective, or 
non-scientific. However, the average individual seems to accept as fact 
the conception that human beings are indeed affected by their plans, 
their intentions, and their goals. For this reason, the inclusion of 
the concept of intentionality seems quite appropriate within attribution 
theory, becaus·e of its cognitive focus; and it appears to be a necessary 
component of the investigation of the way in which the average indivi-
dual responds to inferences about the plans or goals of others. Ryan 
reminds us that although it is possible to construct theories which 
deny the legitimacy of intention, it is also possible to construct 
theories that make use of the concept. \•fuile it may be difficult to 
completely or adequately pinpoint the operation of intentionality 
factors in causal attribution and evaluative judgments, it is indeed 
empirically justified that work be initiated in this area. An examina-
tion of several of the major studies can clearly illustrate this point. 
For example, Lanzetta and Hannah (1969) completely excluded the 
motivational factor from the independent variables of their research on 
the consequences of causal ascription on overt behavior and instead 
merely assumed that subjects were making a motivational inference on 
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the basis of the resultant evaluations of ability and outcome cues. In 
this study subjects were given the task of training a fellow student on 
a concept formation task. The trainee was a confederate whose perform-
ance was predetermined and identical for all trainers. In addition to 
general instructions, each trainer was provided with information both 
about the alleged competence of the trainee and the difficulty of the 
task. The trainer could operate one of five switches which were labeled 
"high shock", "low shock", "neutral", "low reward", and "high reward" to 
provide feedback to the trainee. The results showed that both task 
difficulty and subject competence significantly affected the type and 
level of feedback. Rewards were given for success and punishment for 
failure. Punishment was greater for failure at an easy task than for 
failure at a difficult task, with high ability trainees receiving more 
punishment than low ability trainees. Lanzetta and Hannah suggested 
that poor performance of the trainee was frustrating to the trainer, 
but that the response to frustration was dependent upon the perceived 
cause of the failure. That is, failure by incompetent subjects on 
difficult tasks was probably attributed to stable factors over which the 
trainee had no control and therefore resulted in low levels of punish-
ment. However, when a competent learner failed, especially at an easy 
task, the facts of the situation could not account for the poor per-
formance. Such failures appeared to be attributed to motivational 
factors and considered to be intentional failures, thereby resulting in 
maximum punishment. This study suggested that motivation significantly 
affected evaluative judgment and feedback, but this hypothesis could 
not be tested within the design. 
Weiner and Kukla (1970) criticized the Lanzetta and Hannah study 
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for not directly manipulating the motivational component and attempted 
to correct this flaw by specifying for their subjects the relative 
amount of effort expended by the hypothetical student in their stimulus 
stories. The intention factor was, however, omitted from this analysis. 
Subjects were given information regarding the ability (high or low), 
effort (high or low), and exam perforr.1ance (excellent, fair, borderline, 
moderate failure, or clear failure) of hypothetical students; and, they 
were then asked to give feedback in the form of 1 to 5 gold stars for 
reward or 1 to 5 red stars for punishment. The results showed that 
outcome was a significant effect, i.e. good exam performance was 
rewarded while poor performance was punished and also that effort 
attributions differentially affected feedback, i.e. students who 
expended effort were rewarded more and punished less than those who had 
not. 
Weiner and Peter (1973) included both of Reider's components of 
the motivational factor in their developmental study but oversimplified 
Reider's analysis by treating effort and intention as essentially 
parallel. Although both effort and intention were viewed as motiva-
tional components, effort was considered to be operative only in an 
achievement situation and intent was included only in a moral situation. 
In this study, Weiner and Peter examined the determinants of evaluative 
judgments of success and failure and compared these with the develop-
mental sequence of such judgments observed within a moral situation. 
Three hundred children between the ages of 4 and 18 were asked to make 
evaluative judgments of the actors in sixteen brief stories. Eight 
stories were based upon an ac h ievement related situation (solving a 
puzzle task in school) and eight were based on a moral situation (a 
version of the Piagetian lost child theme). Within each of the situa-
tions the stories differed with regard to the ability of the person 
being judged, the objective outcome or consequence of the action, and 
the effort in the achievement situation or the intent in the moral 
situation. Subjects were required to provide feedback about the 
individual in the story by dispensing reward or punishment with gold 
stars or red stars, as in the Weiner and Kukla (1970) study. 
The results of this study showed that subjects systematically 
used the cues of ability, effort, and outcome when evaluating achieve-
ment related stories. The cues of ability, intent, and outcome were 
used when analyzing moral stories. Highly significant age trends were 
also reported. Subjective cues of effort and intent were found to 
replace objective outcome cues as the main determinant of judgment for 
older children in both the achievement and moral context. However, 
objective outcome re-emerged as the most important determinant of the 
evaluation of achievement stories after the age of twelve. The 
researchers also reported that more rewards were associated with 
achievement behaviors while greater punishments were associated with 
moral behaviors. 
16 
Although Weiner and Peter did not systematically separate the 
relative importance of the two aspects of motivation (intent and effort) 
within the same situation, the results of this study lend some support 
to the hypothesis that these two factors operate in different ways in 
the attribution/evaluation process. Positive moral intent was rewarded 
more highly than was positive effort, while negative moral intent was 
punished more harshly than was lack of effort. A clear interpretation 
of this study is made especially difficult, however, because the two 
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situations (moral and achievement) had differential outcome conse-
quences. That is, in the school achievement situation the outcome of 
the event only affected the child performing the task; whereas, the 
actions of the child in the moral story had consequences for another 
individual as well. In order to make more meaningful comparisons 
between the effects of effort and the effects of intent on evaluative 
judgments, both situational factors and outcome effects would have to be 
controlled in a more systematic manner. 
Weiner and Peter attempted to justify their experimental design 
and the subsequent confounding of motivational and situational effects 
by using the empirical differences to suggest that there are two 
separate motive systems operating, one in achievement situations and one 
in moral situations. Parsons (1974), however, presented theoretical and 
empirical grounds for suggesting that the distinction between moral and 
achievement motive systems is unclear and perhaps arbitrary. First of 
all, regardless of how experimenters differentially label the two types 
of stories, the actual task of an evaluator remains relativel y constant 
despite the content of the story. Whether the evaluator is judging a 
child's performance in school, his behavior on the playground, or his 
obedience of parental or societal rules, the attribution and evaluation 
process may be quite similar. That is, the evaluator must determine 
the causal responsibility of the actor for the outcome and provide the 
actor with an observable evaluative reaction to the incident. Second, 
the classes of cue utilized for evaluative purposes across the two 
motive systems are similar. That is, in either a moral or an achieve-
ment situation, the evaluator assesses the pow-er and motivation com-
ponents of the act. The actor's abilit y , intention, and effort are 
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analyzed in relation to the outcome, and a functional causal judgment is 
reached. The importance of ability, motivation, and outcome cues has 
been documented both in studies of achievement assessment (Eswara, 1972; 
Lanzetta & Hannah, 1969; Rest, Nierenberg, Weiner & Heckhausen, 1973; 
Weiner & Kukla, 1970; Weiner & Peter, 1973) and in studies of moral 
reasoning (Bandura & Mc Donald, 1963; Buchanan & Thompson, 1973; 
Costanzo, Coie, Grumet & Farnill, 1973). 
Kelley (1972) pointed out that the process of evaluation, what-
ever the content, involves both achievement and moral belief systems. 
That is, whether the evaluator is assessing school performance or 
social behavior, the resultant evaluative judgments stem from the 
evaluator's analysis of the actor's ability, the environmental con-
straints or task difficulty, and the evaluator's beliefs about good vs. 
bad, right vs. wrong, moral vs. immoral, laudable vs. reprehensible. 
Since there is little if any clear basis for a distinction between 
motive systems, the differential use of intent cues and effort cues in 
moral and achievement stories by Weiner and Peter (1973) is question-
able. 
Differential Effects of 
Intention Cues and Effort Cues 
One of the major questions that has been neglected in the pre-
viously mentioned research involves an investigation of the differential 
effects of intention cues and effort cues on causal attribution, 
assignment of causal responsibility, and subsequent evaluative judg-
ments. Such an investigation is one of the primary purposes of the 
present research er.deavors. Before proceeding with an examination 
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of the differences in the effects of these two types of cues, however, 
it is important to evaluate whether and in what ways the informational 
value of intention cues may differ from that of effort cues. It is only 
with some understanding of the differences between the cues that one can 
begin to explain any differential effects that might exist. 
Beyond the superficial differences of the words themselves, 
intention cues and effort cues may provide an observer or an evaluator 
with different types of information to be used in the interpretation of 
and evaluation of a particular event. Heider (1958), for example, 
states that information about intention, i.e., what an actor wants to 
do, gives an action its purposive or goal-directed character. According 
to Reider's conceptualization effort, on the other hand, merely denotes 
a force or degree of exertion. From this perspective, one can conceive 
of many situations where intention and effort are complementary. Such 
a case would be when an actor's intention to perform an action was 
accompanied by a degree of effort or force that facilitated the occur-
rence of the action. Another case would be when an actor's intention 
not to perform or to prevent an action was accompanied by insufficient 
effort to accomplish the action or by sufficient effort to counter other 
forces and thus prevent the occurrence of the action. From Reider's 
perspective, however, one can also conceive of situations where inten-
tion and effort are conflicting. Such cases would include those in 
which a particular action was not intended but was accomplished with 
considerable accidental force or exertion. Likewise an action or an 
event that is intended may not be supported by sufficient force to 
facilitate its successful completion, because of momentary influences 
that prevent it. 
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The distinction between effort and intention, as Heider described 
it, is sometimes difficult to maintain. For example, '\~einer and Peter 
(1973) confounded their effort variable by including an implication 
about intent. That is, when specifying the level of effort expended by 
the child in their stimulus stories of an achievement situation, Weiner 
and Peter indicated that the child had or had not "tried" to do the task. 
This use of the word "try" not only implies a degree of effort expendi-
ture or exertion, but also draws the evaluator to inferences about 
intent. That is, the word "try" connotes directionality or valence as 
well .as observable force of the behavior in question. The authors' con-
clusions that the achievement evaluation process appears to be more 
complex than the moral evaluation process may in fact rest on the con-
founding of intent and effort cues ("try") in the achievement related 
stories in contrast to the clear specification of only intent ("want 
to") in the moral stories. 
Ryan (1970) proposes another way of conceptualizing intention as 
a construct that differs from but is related to effort. Intentionality 
may be defined as that aspect of behavior which suggests that actor's 
plan of operation and which essentially unites discrete units of 
behavior into a more complex event. This conception of intent as the 
cement that holds pieces of behavior together would help to illustrate 
why the concept has suffered such neglect in psychology. As several 
analysts have noted, most contemporary psychological research focuses 
on single isolated events and does not evaluate the continuity of the 
stream of behavior (Birch, Atkinson & Bongort, 1974; Lazarus, 1974; 
Kuo, 1967). Viewed in this way, intention refers to the identification 
of the category of goal state toward which the individual is oriented 
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and which organizes a behavioral sequence. Intention might not be 
necessary to explain discrete bits of behavior but it would be necessary 
to understand complex consequences and preparations made by the indi-
vidual for them. Within this framework, effort could be viewed as one 
of the behavioral effects of intention rather than as completely dis-
tinct from it. 
Thus, intention cues and effort cues may indeed provide an 
observer with distinct or complementary information regarding the moti-
vational aspects of any given event or action. According to attribution 
theory, the information once received has an effect upon the causal 
schemata or causal cognitions of the observer. These schemata then 
guide the observer's evaluation of the response to the individual 
observed and to the results of the action or event. A question that 
remains is whether the different information derived ·from intention 
cues and effort cues would have differential effects on the causal 
schemata, and in this way differentially affect the evaluation of and 
response to the actor and the result of the action or event. 
According to Heider (1958), the primary importance of intention 
cues rests in the influence that they exert upon the assignment of 
personal causal responsibility. Heider indicates that such inferences 
about personal causal responsibility are extremely important for the 
evaluation of and response to an event in that personal causal responsi-
bility has serious implications for future events. That is, there are 
different inplications for intentional as opposed to ~ccidental actions 
despite any similarity in their force or effort. Specifically, inten-
tional acts may be considered to reflect a stable characteristic of the 
actor's value system and can, therefore, be expected to be repeated. 
Conversely, unintentional or accidental events will not necessarily 
recur. Since effort cues are said to merely describe the force of 
action, they should not directly influence interpretations of personal 
causal responsibility or affect expectancies for future events. 
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Instead, effort cues may serve to circumscribe intentionality cues and 
either validate or modify them. For example, if an observer made the 
inference that an individual was . very intent on performing a task but 
then saw very little effort expended by the individual, the observer 
would be less certain that the inference about intent was correct. 
Conversely, if an observer inferred a lack of intent but witnessed a 
considerable degree of effort, the observer would question the intention 
inference. Only when the observed effort was commensurate with the 
inferred intent could the observer be more certain of the inference. 
Thus, it can be suggested that within the framework of Reider's proposal 
intention cues would be expected to alter the quality of the evaluation 
such as pleasure vs. displeasure. Effort cues would not be expected to 
effect the assignment of responsibility and thus would not be expected 
to effect the quality of the judgment. However, since they may alter 
the observer's certainty about intent, they would be expected to alter 
the degree of the evaluation such as how pleased or how displeased the 
observer felt. 
Bolles (1962) in discussing the scientific status of "will" or 
intent to action notes that intentionality as an inferred construct 
regarding others' actions is designed to maintain moral control by 
allowing for the societal assignment of blame and perhaps the self-
assignment of guilt. In this lig h t perceived intention is conceptualized 
in a similar manner as that proposed by Heider. That is, the inference 
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of intention is intimately connected with the ascription of personal 
causal responsibility. As with Reider's system, Bolles considers effort 
to have only an indirect relationship with ascribed responsibility for 
causation. 
According to Ryan's (1970) conception, the plan of action 
(intention) explains the force of action (effort). That is, intention 
links segments of effort together in a meaningful way. While Reider's 
system (1958) suggests that effort circumscribes intent and brings cer-
tainty to it, Ryan's system (1970) would suggest that decisions about 
causal responsibility and about the evaluation of an event are based 
upon observations of effort and that such observations are made more 
meaningful by inferences of intent. An analysis of intention would 
serve to either validate or negate the purpose of the effort. Thus it 
may be that effort that does not conform to the actor's •intentions 
would be discounted whereas effort that does conform to the actor's 
intentions would be assessed. 
Because the concept of intentionality does not find a place in 
many theories of psychology, there has been little empirical work done 
in the investigation of intention. As a result there are many types of 
questions which must be addressed before the significance of the 
construct can be understood. Ryan (1970) outlines a nunber of levels at 
which the study of intention is required. These include: 1) determining 
tendency, or how intention influences behavior; 2) formation, or how 
intentions come to be a part of the individual's phenomenology; 3) 
determination, or how intention plays a part in the individual's percep-
tion of the external world; and, 4) development, or how t he individual 
comes to have a repertoire of intentions. i-.fuile research at each level 
of Ryan's taxonomy is necessary in order to develop a more complete 
understanding of the concept of intention, the area which has the most 
relevance for the continued development of Weiner's achievement model 
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of causal attribution is that of whether perception of intention affects 
an individual's perception of the world and the individual's behavior, 
including the individual's evaluation of and response to the behavior 
of others. Such is the focus of the present study. 
Summary 
There has been a great deal of research recently on causal 
attribution processes and their relationship to evaluation of scholastic 
achievement (Eswara, 1972; Parsons, 1974; Rest, Nierenberg, Weiner & 
Heck.~ausen, 1973; Silverstein, 1977; Weiner, 1974b; Zander, Fuller, & 
Armstrong, 1972). This research suggests that causal attributions 
significantly affect an individual's interpretation of and reactions to 
the achievement behavior of himself and others (Kelley, 1972; Weiner, 
1974b). In addition, there are indications that attribution processes 
have important implications for educationally relevant questions 
(Weiner, 1974d; Weiner & Peter, 1973). Weiner (1974d) notes that causal 
attributions seem to influence whether an individual will make attempts 
to achieve, how intensely the individual will work at a particular task, 
how likely that individual will be to persist at a task after an initial 
failure, and how the individual will feel about himself after completion 
of the task. It has also been suggested that attributions influence the 
reward and punishment which teachers dispense to their students, thereby 
affecting the learning of children in school. Thus knowledge in this 
field has significance for those involved with the education of children. 
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Most of the studies using an attribution theory framework to 
study achievement evaluation have incorporated components of Reider's 
(1958) power factor and motivation factor; but these studies have 
neglected to include, or to clearly represent all of the aspects of 
Reider's system. Weiner and Peter (1973) did include both components of 
the motivational factor in their developmental study but oversimplified 
Reider's analysis by treating effort and intention as essentially 
equivalent. Such incomplete analysis of these two aspects of motivation 
presents significant problems in interpreting these studies. Discus-
sions of the results of studies in this area suggest that causal attri-
butions influence the rewards and punishments which teachers dispense 
to their students through a link between the attribution and the judg-
ment that is mediated by an ascription of causal responsibility. The 
relationships between both causal ascription and evaluative judgment to 
the antecedent cues of effort and intention as well as to the various 
types of outcome must be compared; and, the covariation between assign-
ment of responsibility (i.e., causal attribution) and evaluation of 
action must be examined carefully within a single study. 
The present study examines the effects of intention cues and 
effort cues on both attribution of responsibility and on the evaluation 
of achievement. The theoretical basis of the attributional model 
emphasizes the importance of both of these cues. Since the empirical 
evidence suggests the possibility that these two types o·f cues have 
unique effects upon the evaluation of performance, the role of each cue 
was systematically anal yzed. The theoretical basis of the attribution 
model also hypothesizes a direct link between attribution of responsi-
bility and evaluation. In order to evaluate this link, the relationship 
between ascriptions of responsibility and evaluative judgments was 
assessed. 
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As noted previously, research by Rest, Nierenberg, Weiner & 
Heckhausen (1973) suggested that reported levels of effort are perceived 
differently when in combination with varying reported levels of ability. 
Since the motivational variables are of primary importance in the 
present investigation it was determined that compensatory effort 
attributions and their possible confounding effects would need to be 
controlled. Therefore, the ability of the actor to be judged is held at 
an average level. 
Outcome consequences were also investigated. It is frequently 
assumed that when an outcome involves another's welfare, praise and 
blame will be intensified. After all, to perform an action for one's 
own success is expected, but to perform one for someone else's benefit 
is socially commendable. Conversely, to be the cause of one's own 
failure is evaluated poorly, but to cause someone else's failure is 
socially deplorable. Weiner and Peter (1973) suggested that different 
motive systems and attributional systems were at work in their study 
when differences were found between achievement and moral situations. 
However, motivational cues were nested within situational contexts as 
were locus of outcome consequences (Silverstein, 1977). Therefore., in 
the present study, the effects of outcome consequences to the actor 
alone versus outcome consequences to other individuals as well as to the 
actor were examined within th.e context of a single type of academic 
situation. With the addition of the. preceding constraints, the experi-
mental paradigm designed by Weiner and Kukla (1970) and utilized 
successfully by other researchers in the field (Parsons, 1974; 
Silverstein, 1977; Weiner & Peter, 1973) was employed, with stimulus 
stories constructed in the manner used by Weiner and his associates. 
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Because of the implications for the education process and because 
of the necessity for generalizability to real school settings, this 
study was conducted with actual public school teachers. Previous 
research by Silverstein (1977) has indicated that teachers' evaluative 
judgments are affected by the grade level at which the teacher has been 
working. That is, elementary school teachers as a group differ signifi-
cantly from junior high or high school teachers in the importance they 
place on the various causal cues when making an evaluation of a student. 
In order to control this effect, grade level of the teachers employed 
in this study has been held constant. Upper level elementary school 
teachers were selected because of several characteristics related to 
students in these grades, to classroom structure, and to curriculum. 
That is, at this grade level, students are capable of understanding and 
utilizing information about their own or others' motivation, classrooms 
can be alternately structured for individual and zroup activities, the 
curriculum lends itself to instruction through individual or group 
projects, and teachers are typically concerned with development of 
social. skills as well as acquisition of content area information. These 
aspects were considered to be important in order to ensure that the 
situations presented in the stimulus stories would be consonant with 
the actual experience of the subjects. 
Subjects were presented stories in which the following variables 
were manipulated: 1) locus of consequence (individual, group); 2) 
intention (much more intent than, about as intent as, much less intent 
than other children in the class); 3) effort (~uch more effort than, as 
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much effort as, much less effort than other students in the class); 4) 
outcome (pass, fail). Subjects were asked to make evaluative judgments 
of the students in the stories and also to make ascriptions of responsi-
bility of the students for the outcome. Half of the subjects made 
evaluations of the stories then made ascriptions of responsibility; and, 
half of the subjects made ascriptions of responsibility prior to making 
evaluative judgments. The materials, and procedure are presented in 
greater detail in the following chapter. 
Statement of Hypotheses 
I. Evaluative Judgments: 
A. Evaluative judgments of events will be significantly affected 
by the outcome of the event. More positive evaluations will 
be made for success at a task than for failure at a task. 
B. Evaluative judgments of events will be significantly affected 
by the situational variable, locus of outcome consequence. 
Positive evaluations for success and negative evaluations for 
failure will be enhanced when effects are to another as well 
as to the actor. 
C. Evaluative judgments will be significantly affected differen-
tially by the specified motivational causal cues. 
1. Intention cues will significantly affect evaluative 
judgments of the students in the stories. More posi-
tive evaluations will be made for positive intention 
than for neutral or negative intention, and more 
positive evaluations will be made for neutral than 
negative intention regarding performance of the task. 
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2. Effort cues will significantly affect evaluative 
judgments of the students in the stories. }fore posi-
tive evaluations will be made for above average effort 
than for average or below average effort, and more 
positive evaluations will be made for average than 
below average effort. 
3. Interactions between intention and other experimental 
variables will differ for those of effort and the 
other experimental variables. 
4. Intention and effort cues will interact. Statements 
of intent will be evaluated differently at the three 
levels of effort; statements of effort will be evalu-
ated differently at the three levels of intent. 
5. Specifically, intention and effort cues will combine 
such that the most positive evaluations will be made 
for those events where the individual was above 
average on both intention and effort, while the least 
positive evaluations will be made for those events 
where the individual was below average on both inten-
tion and effort. 
II. Ascriptions of Responsibility: 
A. Ascription of responsibility will not be altered significantly 
by the outcome of the event. 
B. Ascription of responsibility will be affected significantly 
by the specified motivational causal cues. 
1. Based upon Reider's system it would be expected that 
attributions of responsibility would be affected 
significantly by intention cues but not by effort 
cues. 
2. Based upon Ryan's conceptualization it would be ex-
pected that attributions of responsibility would be 
significantly affected by both intention cues and 
effort cues. 
III. Relationship Between Evaluative Judgments and Attributions of 
Responsibility: 
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Evaluative judgments regarding the outcome of events will be based 
upon intervening attributions of responsibility. 
1. The most e~treme levels of evaluation, both positive 
and negative;will be dispensed when personal causal 
responsibility is attributed to the individual being 
judged. 
2. The smallest levels of evaluation, both positive and 
negative, will be dispensed when personal causal 
responsibility is not attributed to the individual 
being judged. 
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II. METHOD 
Subjects 
Seventy-two elementary school teachers of grades three through 
six, inclusive, served as subjects in this study. Subjects were volun-
teers recruited from five cooperating school districts in Rhode Island 
(Pawtucket, South Kingstown, Warwick) and Massachusetts (Attleboro, 
Taunton) through the assistance of building principals or school psy-
chologists. Of the seventy-two, twenty were third grade teachers, 
twenty were fourth grade teachers, sixteen were fifth grade teachers, 
and sixteen were sixth grade teachers. The school buildings from which 
teachers were selected served children of working class through upper 
middle class populations in suburban, and semi-rural areas. 
Teachers from each grade and from each school building were sys-
tematically assigned across four between subject groups to ensure such 
that neither grade levels nor schools were nested within any treatment 
condition and that all grades and schools were represented in each 
condition. 
Fifty-six subjects were females and sL'{teen were males. The 
range of teaching experience was from one through thirty-three years 
according to the following distribution: two were in their first year 
of teaching, twenty-two had from two through five years of experience, 
thirty had from six through ten years of experience, ten had from eleven 
through fifteen years of experience, and eight had sixteen or more years 
of experience. The sample, therefore, appears to be representative of 
the general teaching population. The only bias involved would be that 
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of willingness to volunteer for a study such as this. 
Materials 
Thirty-six stimulus stories were constructed in a manner consis-
tent with previous research. Stories varied only minimally according to 
the classes of informational cue variables being manipulated. The 
salient experimental cues were presented concisely within the context of 
a school related activity. 
In each story a student was described as a child who was generally 
capable of an average level of achievement, therefore capable of com-
pleting the task of gathering information about a specific topic and 
writing a report within a time period of three weeks. The experimental 
variable cues were then presented. 
Stories varied on two motivational causal cue dimensions; 1) the 
child's intent to perform the task as inferred from statements the 
child had made to the teacher and other students (much more intent than-, 
about as much intent as-, or much less intent than most of the other 
students in the class); and, 2) the child's effort in terms of the 
amount of time spent gathering information and writing the paper (much 
more effort than-, as much effort as-, or much less effort than most of 
the other students in the class). Two levels of outcome (pass or fail) 
were used. One situational variable, locus of consequence, was manipu-
lated. The two levels of this variable were: 1) an incident in which 
only the actor himself was affected by the performance, i.e., if the 
child passed he/she could go on a class trip but if the child failed 
he/she would forfeit the trip; and, 2) an incident in which other 
children were affected by the actor's performance, i.e. if the child 
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passed he/she and his classmates could go on the trip but if anyone 
failed the trip would be postponed . . These dimensions (3 levels of inten-
tion x 3 levels of effort x 2 levels of outcome x 2 levels of situation) 
were crossed factorially resulting in thirty-six different stories. Each 
subject received either all individual stories or all group stories. 
The order of cue presentation was held constant throughout all stories. 
Common male and female names of one or two syllables, and without 
particular ethnic connotation were selected to identify the children in 
the stories. The sex of the child in each story of situation 1 was 
randomly determined and an ~ppropriate name was then assigned to the 
story. The same name was then used for the companion story of situation 
2. 
The stories were each printed on a separate piece of 8 1/2 x 11" 
paper and were presented to the subjects in booklet form. Half of the 
booklets contained all eighteen stories with the outcome affecting only 
the individual actor (I). Half of the booklets contained all eighteen 
stories with the outcome affecting a group of other students as well as 
the actor (G). All booklets contained a cover sheet for recording sub-
ject information and for providing a brief introduction to the task. 
A detailed scenario provided the instructional context of the project 
task assigned to the class and the particular consequences of success 
and failure either for the actor alone or for the actor and others. 
Each booklet contained two distinct sets of eighteen individual stories 
or two distinct ty-pes of group stories in order that two types of 
responses could be gathered. For each booklet and within each set, 
stories were arranged in a different random order . 
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Specific directions regarding responses were provided at the 
beginning of each set of stories. Teachers were asked to make an evalu-
ative judgment about the students in one of the sets of stories. They 
were asked to respond as they would to actual students in their classes; 
and, they were asked to indicate their reaction to the actor's behavior 
by circling only one choice on an eleven point scale ranging from -5 
through Oto +5 presented horizontally beneath the story. Pluses indi-
cated that they were pleased with the child's behavior and minuses indi-
cated that they were displeased. For the other set of stories, the 
teachers were asked to assess the degree to which the child was 
personally responsible for the event. They were asked to respond as 
they would to actual students in their classes; and to indicate their 
reaction to the child by circling one of five alternative choices 
ranging from no responsibility to complete responsibility for the event. 
Half of the booklets required teachers to make evaluative judgments of 
the eighteen stories then to make decisions of responsibility for the 
eighteen stories (E:R); and, the other half of the booklets required 
teachers to make decisions of responsibility for the eighteen stories 
then to make evaluative judgments (R:E). 
In summary, the materials reflected two between subject factors: 
locus of consequence (Individual, Group) and order of presentation 
(E:R, R:E). Thus, there were four t ypes of booklets: IER, IRE, GER, 
GRE. There were three within subject variables incorporated into the 
eighteen stimulus stories: inten t (abo•,e average, average, below aver-
age), effort (above average, average, below average), and outcome (pass, 
fail). Each subject was asked to make an evaluative judgment of the 
actor in a set of eighteen stories and to judge the child's responsi-
bility in another set of eighteen stories. 
Procedure 
Volunteers were recruited from elementary schools by principals 
or school psychologists. Teachers were told that this study was an 
investigation of how teachers evaluate their students, that their time 
and assistance would be sincerely appreciated, and that anonymity of 
their responses would be ensured. 
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A booklet of stimulus stories and a plain manila envelope was 
then given to each volunteer teacher. Booklets were distributed sys-
tematically so that subjects from each building and at the various grade 
levels were assigned across the four between subject conditions. 
Teachers were asked to complete the book.let on their own time without 
collaborating with other volunteers, to enclose the booklet in the 
envelope provided and return it to the designated place in the school 
building within one week. Booklets were then returned to the experi-
menter. 
Data were collected during three academic semesters from January 
1978 until June 1979. 
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III. RESULTS 
This study involved two separate dependent measures: evaluative 
judgments and ascriptions of responsibility. These two dependent meas-
ures were analyzed separately using a five way analysis of variance 
design (2x2x3x3x2) with each of the following factors: a) situational 
effect (individual, group), b) order (Evaluation-Responsibility, 
Responsibility-Evaluation), c) intent (above average, average, below 
average), d) effort (above average, average, below average), e) outcome 
(pass, fail). Subjects were nested within situational effects and order, 
with repeated measures across the remaining three factors. In addition, 
the relationship between the evaluative judgment of a story and the 
ascription of responsibility for that story was examined by means of 
Pearson correlation coefficients computed separately for each of the 
eighteen stories in both the individual and the group situations. The 
relationship between a subject's tendency to give an extreme evaluation 
was examined by means of rank order correlation coefficients computed 
separately for the four between subject conditions. 
Because of the number and complexity of the statistical tests 
employed in this study the results will be presented in the following 
order: first, all of the results of the analysis of variance for evalua-
tive judgments; second, all of the results for the analysis of variance 
for ascriptions of responsibility; and finally, all of the results of 
the correlation between the two dependent measures. 
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A.NOVA: Evaluative Judgments 
The five way analysis of variance (2x2x3x3x2) resulted in 72 
separate cells each containing 18 observations. Means and standard 
deviations for each of the 72 cells of this analysis of evaluative judg-
ment responses are presented in Table 1. Order, designated E:R or R:E, 
indicates the manner in which subjects provided their responses to the 
stimulus stories. Order E:R designates the group of subjects who first 
made evaluative judgments and then determined the responsibility of the 
actors in the stories, while order R:E represents the opposite order of 
presentation. In this study the condition represented in each story 
will be specified by a three digit number sequence where the first num-
ber designates intention (1 = much more intent (above average), 2 = 
about as intent (average), 3 = much less intent (below average)), the 
second number designates effort (1 = much more effort (above average), 
2 = about as much effort (average), 3 = much less effort (.below average)), 
and the third number designates outcome (1 = pass, 2 = fail). 
Table 2 summarizes the results of the overall analysis of 
variance of evaluative judgments. The alpha level was set at p<.05 for 
all analyses involving the between subject factors, situation and order. 
Because of the sensitivity of the within subjects design, the alpha 
level was set at p<.01 for those factors involving repeated measures. 
Significant differences were found for the following main effects: a) 
intention, F(2,136) = 18.11, p<.01; b) effort, F(2,136) = 190.11, p<.01; 
and c) outcome, F(l,68) = 187.11, p<.01. Three of the . two-way inter-
actions were significant: a) intent x outcome, F(2,136) = 14.78, p<.01; 
b) effort x outcome, F(2,136) = 6.45, p<.01; and, c) effort x order, 
F(2,136) = 4.72, p<.01. None of the three-way, four-way or five-way 
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TABLE 1 
Means and Standard Deviations for Evaluative Judgments for Situation, 
Order, and Three Conditions (Intent, Effort, Outcome) 
Part 1. Individual Situation 
Order 
Condition E:R R:E 
IEO X sd X sd 
111 4.6111 • 778 4.5000 .707 
112 - .6667 2.401 • 7778 2.647 
121 3.3889 1.461 2.7222 1.320 
122 -1.1111 2.083 .2778 1.934 
131 .7222 2.421 .3889 1.852 
132 -2.2222 2.290 -2.4444 1. 789 
211 4.0000 .840 3.2222 1.768 
212 - . 7778 2.691 .9444 2. 711 
221 2.2222 1.263 1. 7222 1.274 
222 -1.3889 2.004 - .4444 1.423 
231 .5000 2.503 - .3333 1.879 
232 -2.1111 2.423 -2.4444 1.338 
311 3.2222 1.987 3.0556 2.363 
312 - .1111 2.632 1.0556 2.980 
321 2.6111 1.614 2.0000 1.847 
322 -1.1111 2.083 - .1667 2.203 
331 .1667 2.479 -1.1667 2.093 
332 -1.6667 2.657 -2.8333 1. 791 
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TABLE 1 - Continued 
Part 2. Group Situation 
Order 
Condition E:R R:E 
IEO X sd X sd 
111 4. 7778 .548 4.72/42 .575 
112 
- .5556 2.975 . 7778 3.300 
121 3.0556 1.259 3.0000 1.782 
122 - .6667 2.401 - .4444 2.382 
131 • 7222 1.487 .6111 2.173 
132 -2. 6111 1.501 -2. 7778 2.045 
211 3.8333 1.425 3.6667 2.326 
212 - .4444 2.975 - .2222 3.210 
221 2. 2778 1.320 2.7222 2.137 
222 -1.1667 2.093 - .6111 2.356 
231 1.0000 1.815 - .1667 2. 005 
232 -2.1111 2.026 -2. 7222 2.081 
311 3.1111 2.349 3.3333 1.645 
312 - .6667 2.970 - .2222 2.439 
321 2.2778 1.274 2.0556 2.508 
322 -1. 5556 2.255 -1.1111 2.193 
331 - .3333 2.275 .2222 2.625 
332 -3.2222 1. 700 -3.0556 2.209 
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TABLE 2 
ANOVA Summary Table for Evaluative Judgments 
Source Sum of Degrees of Mean F 
Squares Freedom Square 
Situation (S) 5.316 1 5.316 .29 
Order (Or) 3.260 1 3.260 .18 
SxOr 1.563 1 1.563 .09 
error Ss(SxOr) 1234.330 68 18.153 
Intention (I) 82. 779 2 41.390 18.11* 
IxS 10.057 2 5.029 2.20 
IxOr 7.160 2 3.579 1.57 
IxSxOr 5.227 2 2.613 1.14 
error IxSs(SxOr) 310.778 136 2.285 
Effort (E) 2099. 677 2 1049.839 190.11* 
ExS .335 2 .167 .03 
ExOr 52.122 2 26.061 4.72* 
ExSxOr 6.514 2 3.257 .59 
error ExSs(SxOr) 751.019 136 5.522 
IxE 12.193 4 3.048 1.72 
IxExS 7.508 4 1.877 1.06 
IxExOr 2.897 4 . 724 .41 
IxExSxOr 14.273 4 3.568 2.02 
error IxExSs(SxOr) 480.796 272 1. 768 
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TABLE 2 - Continued 
Source Sum of Degrees of Mean F 
Squares Freedom Square 
Outcome (Ot) 3556.797 1 3556.797 187.11* 
OtxS 31. 797 1 31.797 1.67 
OtxOr 59.204 1 59.204 3.11 
OtxSxOr 12.445 1 12.445 .65 
error OtxSs(SxOr) 1292.590 68 19.009 
IxOt 45.520 2 22.760 14.78* 
IxOtxS 4. 724 2 2.362 1.53 
IxOtxOr 3.048 2 1.524 .99 
IxOtxSxOr 1.992 2 .996 .65 
error IxOtxSs(SxOr) 209.383 136 1.540 
ExOt 70.187 2 35.093 6.45* 
ExOtxS . 715 2 .357 .07 
ExOtxOr 20.261 2 10.130 1. 86 
ExOtxSxOr 3.252 2 1.626 .30 
error ExOtxSs(SxOr) 739.920 136 5 .4 41 
IxExOt 8.434 4 2.108 1.39 
IxExOtxS 3.119 4 .780 .52 
I xExOtxOr 5.397 4 1.349 .89 
I xExOtxSxOr 3.08 2 4 .770 .51 
error I xExOtxSs(S xOr) 411. 636 272 1. 513 
42 
interactions were significant. 
Intention x Outcome Interaction 
Table 2 shows that the intention x outcome interaction (IxOt) was 
significant. This significant relationship indicates that the differ-
ences which exist between the evaluations of the various stories were 
influenced by the descriptions of the child's intent presented in the 
stimulus stories as well as by the outcome of the event. Table 3 (A) 
and (B) gives the mean evaluative judgments for the three levels of 
intention and the two types of outcome. 
TABLE 3(A) 
Mean Evaluation of Above Average, Average, and 
Below Average Intention by Outcome 
Intent: 
Above Average 
Average 
Below Average 
Pass 
2.7658 
2.0555 
1.7130 
Outcome 
Fail 
- • 9722 
-1.1250 
-1.2222 
TABLE 3(B) 
Mean Evaluation of Above Average, Average, and 
Below Average Effort by Outcome 
Effort: 
Above Average 
Average 
Below Average 
Pass 
3.8380 
2.5046 
.1944 
Outcome 
Fail 
- .0093 
.7917 
-2.5185 
In order to interpret the interaction, a simple effects test of 
intention at the two levels of outcome was performed. These results 
are presented in Table 4. 
Source 
Outcome: 
TABLE 4 
A.NOVA Summary Table: Simple Effects of 
Intention at Two Levels of Outcome 
Sum of Degrees of Mean 
Squares Freedom Square 
F 
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Pass 125.423 2 62.6310 32.7568* 
Fail 6.849 2 3.425 1. 791 
Error 272 1.912 
These results indicate that while statements about the child's relative 
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level of intention had a significant effect on teachers' evaluations of 
passing performance, F(2,272) = 32.7568, p<.01, intention was not a 
significant determinant of the evaluation of failure, F(2,272) = 1.791, 
p>.05. These results are illustrated in Figure 1. 
Thus it can be seen that in the stories depicting a child who 
successfully completed the assigned task, teachers utilized the inten-
tion cues so that evluations were more positive as a function of rela-
tively greater intent to perform. However, in stories depicting a child 
who was unsuccessful at completing the assigned task, differences in 
evaluations as a function of relative intent to perform were negligible. 
In order to determine the source of the differences between the three 
levels of relative intention in the passing condition, a Newman-Keuls 
Multiple Comparison Test was performed. The results of this test indi-
cate a significant difference between each of the three levels of inten-
tion. An inference of above average intent was most highly influential 
and produced significantly more positive evaluations than either average 
or below average intent (p<.01). In addition, average intent produced 
significantly more positive evaluations than below average intent 
(p<.01). 
The relative effect of the levels of intention on teachers' 
evaluations of students' performance was examined by means of trend 
analyses. The results of the test of trend revealed a ·quadratic 
relationship between evaluative judgments and the intent of the student, 
F(l,272) = 7.754, p<.01. As illustrated in Figure 1, the increased 
positive value of above average intent to perform over the value of 
average intent to perform (mean difference = • 713) was greater than the 
decrease in evaluation of below average intent to perform (mean 
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Figure · 1. Evaluation of above average, average, and below average 
intention as a f unction of outcome. 
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difference= .342). 
Effort x Outcome Interaction 
Table 2 shows that the effort x outcome interaction (ExOt) was 
significant, indicating that the differences which exist between the 
teachers' evaluations were influenced by the descriptions of the child's 
effort expenditure as well as by the outcome of the event. The mean 
evaluative judgments for the three levels of effort and the two types 
of outcome are presented in Table 3 (B). 
In order to interpret the interaction, a simple effects test of 
effort at the two levels of outcome was performed. The results are 
presented in Table 5. 
Source 
Outcome: 
Pass 
Fail 
Error 
TABLE 5 
ANOVA Summary Table: Simple Effects of Effort 
at Two Levels of Outcome 
Sum of Degrees of Mean 
Squares Freedom Square 
1451.818 2 725.909 
712.092 2 356.559 
272 5.481 
F 
132.441* 
64.96 
These results indicate that statements about the chi l d 1 s level of effort 
had a significant effect on teachers' evaluative judgments of both 
passing performance, F(2,272) = 132. 441, p<.01, and failing per f ormance, 
F(2,272) = 64.96, p<.01. Figure 2 illustrates these results. 
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Figure 2. Evaluation of above average, average, and below average 
effort as a function of outcome. 
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In order to determine the source of the differences between the 
three levels of effort, a Newman-Keuls Multiple Col!lparison Test was 
performed for both outcomes. The results indicate with both passing 
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and failing outcome a statement of above average effort produced signifi-
cantly more positive evaluations than either average or below average 
effort (p<.01). In addition, a statement of average effort produced 
significantly more positive evaluations than below average effort 
(p<.01). 
The relative effect of the levels of effort on teachers' evalua-
tions of a students' performance was examined by means of trend analy-
ses. The results of the test of trend for positive outcome revealed a 
quadratic relationship .between the effort of the student in the story 
and the evaluative judgr.ients made by teachers, F(l,272) = 13.803, 
p<.01. As illustrated in Figure 2, with passing outcome the increased 
positive value of above average effort over average effort (mean 
difference= 1.3334) was less than the decreased positive value of below 
average effort (mean difference= 2.3102). That is, the degree to which 
teachers' evaluations were affected by level of effort was significantly 
greater between average and below average than between average and above 
average. The results of the test of trend for negative outcome revealed 
a quadratic relationship between the relative effort of the student in 
the story and the evaluative judgments made by teachers, F(l,272) = 
17. 5767, p<. 01. As illustrated in Figure 2, with failing outcome . the 
degree to which the negat i vity c£ teachers' evaluations were affected 
by level of effort was significantl y greater between average and below 
average (raean difference= 1.7269) than between average and above 
average (mean difference= .7826). 
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Thus, for both passing and failing outcome, the effect of below 
average effort in comparison with average effort was greater than the 
relative effect of above average effort. An analysis of the means shows 
that the relative effect of above average effort was greater in the case 
of passing outcome (mean difference= 1.3334) than in the case of 
failing outcome (mean difference= .7824). The effect of below average 
effort is also greater for success (mean difference= 2.3102) than 
failure (mean difference= 1.7268). That is, the pattern of greater 
relative effect of below average effort is enhanced in the case of 
success. 
For the purpose of contrasting the differential effects of effort 
and intention, the intention x outcome results and effort x outcome 
results are graphically presented in Figure 3. These results indicate 
that for passing outcome the relative effect of above average intention 
is greater than that of below average intention, whereas the relative 
effect of above average effort is less than that of below average 
effort. For failing outcome the relative effect of below average effort 
is greater than the effect of above average effort, while the relative 
effects of intention are not significantly different. 
Effort x Order Interaction 
Table 2 shows that the effort x order interaction (ExOr) was 
significant. This significant relationship indicates that the differ-
ences which exist between teachers' evaluations of above average, 
average, and below average effort were influenced by whether teachers 
r.i.ade their evaluations before or after making ascriptions of responsi-
bility. Table 6 (A) presents the mean evaluative judgments for the 
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Figure 3. Evaluation of passing and failing outcome as a function of 
relative effort in contrast with evaluation as a function of relative 
intent. 
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three levels of effort and the two orders of response class. 
TABLE 6 (A) 
Mean Evaluation of Above Average, Average, and 
Below Average Effort by Order of Presentation 
Order 
E:R R:E 
Effort: 
Above Average 1. 6944 2.1343 
Average .7361 .9685 
:Below Average 
-
.8889 -1.3935 
TABLE 6 (B) 
Mean Evaluation of Above Average, Average, and Below 
Average Intention by Order of Presentation 
Order 
E:R R:E 
Intention: 
Above Average .78703 .02778 
Average • l~8608 • li4450 
Below Average .22685 .26389 
In order to interpret the interaction, a simple effects test of 
order at the three levels of effort was performed, and the results are 
presented in Table 7. 
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Source 
Effort: 
Above Average 
Average 
Below Average 
Error 
TABLE 7 
ANOVA Summary Table: Simple Effects of 
Order at Three Levels of Effort 
Sum of Degrees of Mean 
Squares Freedom Square 
20.895 1 20.895 
5.3837 1 5.3837 
27.521 1 27.521 
204 9.732 
52 
F 
2.147 
.599 
2.828 
These results indicate that order was not a significant determinant of 
teachers' evaluations within any of the three levels of effort: a) above 
average effort, F(l,204) = 2.147, p >.05; b) average effort, F(l,204) = 
.599, p>.05; and, c) be l ow average effort, F(l,204) = 2.828, p>.05. 
These results are illustrated in Figure 4. 
The test of the simple effects of effort at the two levels of 
order are presented in Table 8. 
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Figure 4. Evaluations of above average, average, and below average 
effort as a function of order of presentation. 
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Source 
Order: 
E:R 
R:E 
Error 
TABLE 8 
ANOVA Summary Table: Simple Effects of 
Effort at Two Levels of Order 
Sum of Degrees of Mean 
Squares Freedom Square 
749.723 2 374.862 
1395.620 2 697.810 
272 5.522 
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F . 
67.885* 
126.37* 
These results indicate that statements about the child's relative effort 
had a significant effect of teachers' evaluative judgments both when 
evaluations were made.first, F(2,272) = 67.885, p<.01; and, when evalua-
tions were made following ascriptions of responsibility, F(2,272) = 
125.39, p<.01. 
In order to determine the source of the differences between the 
three levels of effort a Newman-Keuls Multiple Comparison Test was per-
formed for both orders. It was found that, for order E:R and order R:E, · 
a statement of above average effort was most highly influential and 
produced significantly more positive evaluations than ,either average or 
below average effort (p<.01). In addition, a statement of average 
effort produced significantly more positive evaluations than a statement 
of below average effort (p<.01). 
The relative effect of effort on teachers' evaluations was 
examined by means of trend anal yses which revealed a quadratic relation-
ship between the level of effort in the stor y and the evaluative judg-
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ments made by teachers for order E:R, F(l,272) = 8.693, p<.01; and, for 
order R:E F(l.272) = 27,9897, p<.01. As illustrated in Figure 4, the 
degree to which teacher evaluations were affected by level of effort 
was significantly greater between average and below average effort than 
between average and above average; and, this effect was magnified when 
teachers had previously made decisions about the responsibility of the 
students for the outcome of the event being evaluated. 
For the purpose of contrasting the differential effects of effort 
and intention, the effort x order results and the intention x order 
results which were presented in Table 6 are illustrated in Figure 5. 
An examination of Figure 5 reveals that the significant positive effects 
of above average and average effort and the significant negative effect 
of below average effort are magnified when attributions of responsi-
bility precede evaluative judgments. That is, by having someone assess 
responsibility of the actor for the event prior to evaluating the actor, 
the effort dimension becomes more salient and results in much more 
extreme responses to effort. In contrast, the positive effect of above 
average intention is diminished by prior ascription of responsibility. 
ANOVA: Responsibility Ascriptions 
A five way analysis of variance (2x2x3x3x2) resulted in 72 
separate cells each containing 18 observations. Means and standard 
deviations for each of the 72 cells of this analysis of responsibility 
ascriptions are presented in Table 9. 
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Figure 5. Evaluations for order 1 (E:R) and order 2 (R:E) as a function 
of relative effort. 
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TABLE 9 
Means and Standard Deviations for Responsibility Ascriptions for 
Situation, Order, and Three Conditions 
(Intent, Effort, Outcome) 
Part 1. Individual Situation 
Order 
Condition E:R R:E 
IEO X sd X sd 
111 4.5000 .786 4.5556 .984 
112 2.6111 1.037 2.2222 .943 
121 4.2222 .943 4.0556 1.056 
122 2.7222 .895 2.6667 .970 
131 3.2222 .878 3.3333 1.237 
132 3.3333 .907 3. 7222 1.018 
211 4.2222 .808 4.2222 1.114 
212 2.3889 .979 2.3889 .979 
221 3.6667 .647 3. 7222 1.179 
222 2.8889 .758 3.3333 1.138 
231 2.6667 .970 2.6667 1.188 
232 3.8333 .924 4.2778 .752 
311 3.8889 .963 4.2778 1.018 
312 2. 7778 .943 2.2778 .826 
321 3.3333 .76 7 3.6667 1.085 
322 · 2.9444 .802 3. 2778 1.127 
331 2.8333 1.249 2.5556 1.423 
332 3.4444 1. Lf23 4.3889 . 778 
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TABLE 9 - Continued 
Part 2. Group Situation 
Order 
Condition E:R R:E 
- -IEO X sd X sd 
111 4.4444 .784 4.2222 1.309 
112 2.1667 .985 2.0000 1.805 
121 4.0000 .970 3.8333 1.465 
122 2. 7778 1.114 2.5556 1.247 
131 3.3889 1.092 2.8889 1.410 
132 3.5000 1.150 3.3333 .985 
211 4.2667 .826 4.0556 1.305 
212 2.3333 1.085 1.8889 .963 
221 3.8889 .900 3.5556 1.294 
222 3.0556 1.211 2.3889 1.145 
231 3.2222 1.114 2.6667 1.263 
232 3.7222 1.127 3.9444 1.110 
311 4.0556 .873 3.8889 1.367 
312 2.4444 1.042 2.3333 1.188 
321 3.6111 1.145 3.2778 1.179 
322 3.1111 1.023 3.1667 1.098 
331 3.0000 1.283 2.8333 1.295 
332 3.8333 1.295 4.2778 .895 
59 
Table 10 sunnnarizes the results of the overall analysis of 
variance of responsibility ascriptions. The alpha level was set at 
p<.05 for all analyses involving the between subject factors, situation 
and order. Because of the sensitivity of the within subjects design, 
the alpha level was set at p<.01 for those factors involving repeated 
measures. Significant differences were found for the main effect of 
outcome, F(l,68) = 33.63, p<.01. Two of the two-way interactions were 
significant: a) intention x outcome, F(2,136) = 21.97, p<.01; and b) 
effort x outcome, F(2,36) = 118.78, p<.01. None of the three-way, 
four-way, or five-way interactions were significant. 
TABLE 10 
A..~OVA Summary Table for Responsibility Ascriptions 
Source Sum of Degrees of Mean F 
Squares Freedom Square 
Situation (S) 1.778 1 1. 778 .26 
Order (Or) .309 1 .309 .04 
SxOr 6.531 1 6.531 • 9Lf 
error Ss (SxOr) 470.370 68 6.917 
Intention (I) .816 2 .408 1.10 
IxS 1.282 2 .641 1.72 
IxOr 1.946 2 .973 2.61 
IxSxOr 1.307 2 .654 1. 75 
error IxSs(SxOr) 50.648 136 .372 
Effort (E) 3.511 2 1.755 2.37 
ExS 4.042 2 2.021 2.73 
ExOr 4.270 2 2.135 2.89 
ExSxOr .974 2 .487 .66 
error ExSs(SxOr) 100.537 136 .739 
IxE .563 4 .141 .49 
IxExS .384 4 .096 .33 
IxExOr .378 4 .095 .33 
IxExSxOr 1.008 4 .252 .88 
error IxExSs(SxOr) 78.000 272 .287 
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TABLE 10 - Continued 
Outcome (Ot) 122.225 1 122.225 33.63* 
OtxS .694 1 .694 .19 
OtxOr 2.596 1 2.596 • 71 
OtxSxOr .151 1 .151 .04 
error OtxSs(SxOr) 24 7 .111 68 3.634 
IxOt 35.289 2 17.644 21. 97* 
IxOtxS 3.532 2 1. 766 2.20 
IxOtxOr .140 2 .070 .09 
IxOtxSxOr 1.353 2 .677 .84 
error IxO txS s (SxOr) 109.241 136 . .803 
ExOt 428.955 2 214.478 118. 78* 
ExOtxS .171 2 .086 .05 
ExOtxOr 11. 585 2 5.792 3.21 
ExOtxSxOr 1.270 2 .635 .35 
error ExOtxSs(SxOr) 245.574 136 1.806 
IxExOt 3,Lf06 4 .851 2.13 
IxExOtxS 1.338 4 .334 .84 
IxExOtxOr 1.221 4 .305 .76 
IxExOtxSxOr 3.517 4 .879 2.20 
error IxExOtxSs(SxOr) 108.630 272 .399 
Intention x Outcome Interaction 
Table 10 shows that the intention x outcome interaction (IxOt) 
was significant, indicating that the differences which exist in the 
ascriptions of responsibility were influenced by the descriptions of the 
child's intent as well as by the outcome of the event. Table 11 (~) 
gives the mean responsibility rating for three levels of intention and 
two types of outcome. 
TABLE 11 (A) 
Mean Responsibility Rating of Above Average, Average, 
and Below Average Intention by Outcome 
Outcome 
Pass Fail 
Intent: 
Above Average 3.8889 2.8796 
Average 3.5880 3.0370 
Below Average 3.4352 3.1898 
TABLE 11 (B) 
Mean Responsibility Rating of Above Average, Average, 
and Below Average Effort by Outcome 
Outcome 
Pass Fail 
Effort: 
Above Average 4.2176 2.361 
Average 3.7454 2.9074 
Below Average 2.949 3.8427 
In order to interpret the interaction, a simple effects test of 
outcome at three levels of intention was performed. These results are 
presented in Table 12. 
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TABLE 12 
AJ.~OVA Summary Table: Simple Effects of 
Outcome at Three Levels of Intention 
Source Sum of Degrees of Mean 
Squares Freedom Square 
Intention: 
Above Average 110.0036 1 110.0036 
Average 32.7859 1 32.7859 
Below Average 6.503 1 6.503 ' 
Error 272 . 77124 
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F 
142.632* 
42.511* 
8.431* 
These results indicate that the outcome of the event had a significant 
effect upon ratings of responsibility for all three levels of intention: 
a) above average intention, F(l,272) = 142.632, p<.01; b) average in-
tention, F(l,272) = 42.5106, p<.01; and, c) below average intention, 
F(l,272) = 8.43188, p<.01. A comparison of the F ratios suggests that 
the magnitude of the effect varied across the three levels. Differing 
outcome produced the greatest effect for above average degree of intent. 
The smallest effect was found for below average degree of intent. These 
results are illustrated in Figure 6. In addition, a simple effects test 
of intention at the two levels of outcome was performed. These results 
are presented in Table 13 and they indicate that intention significantly 
affected responsibility ratings for both passing outcome, F (2,272) = 
19.5777, p<.01; and, failing outcome, F(2,272) = 8.841, p<.01. As 
illustrated by Figure 6, the effects of intent appear to be greater in 
the case of success than in the case of failure. In order to determine 
s.oo-
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4.00-
3.00 
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r e spon si ble) 
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Figure 6. Responsibility ratings for passing and failing outcome as a 
function of level of intention. 
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Source 
Outcome: 
Pass 
Fail 
Error 
TABLE 13 
ANOVA Summary Table: Simple Effects of 
Intention at Two Levels of Outcome 
Sum of Degrees of Mean 
Squares Freedom Square 
23.0147 2 11.50735 
10.3935 2 5.19675 
272 .5878 
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F 
19.577* 
8.841* 
the source of these effects, a Newman-Keuls Multiple Comparison Test was 
performed. It was found that in the case of passing outcome, a state-
ment of relatively above average intent to perform was most hig~ly 
influential and produced ratings of responsibility that were signifi-
cantly greater than either average or below average intent, p<.01. In 
addition, a statement of average intent produced ratings of signifi-
cantly greater responsibility than below average intent, p<.05. In the 
case of failing outcome, a statement of below average intent produced 
significantly greater ratings of responsibility than average intent, 
p<.05 or above average intent, p<.01. In addition, average intent pro-
duced significantly greater ratings of responsibility than did a state-
ment of above average intent, p<.05. 
The relative effect of levels of the intention variable on 
teachers' ratings of responsibility was examined by trend analyses. The 
results of the test of trend for positive outcome revealed a quadratic 
relationship between the intent of the student in the story and the 
responsibility ratings made by the teachers, F(l,272) = 4.0286, p<.05. 
As illustrated in Figure 6, when outcome was positive, the increased 
degree of responsibility of above average intent to perform over 
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average intent to perform (mean difference= .301) was greater than the 
decreased degree of responsibility of below average intent to perform 
beneath average intent (mean difference= .153). The results of the 
test of trend for negative outcome revealed a linear relationship 
between the intent of the student in the story and the degree of 
responsibility attributed to the student, F(l,272) = 17.6808, p<.01. As 
illustrated in Figure 6, the increased degree of responsibility of rela-
tively below average intent in comparison with average intent (mean 
difference= .157) was quite similar to the decreased degree of responsi-
bility of above average intent in comparison with average intent (mean 
difference= .153). Thus, in the case of success, above average intent 
to perform had a much stronger effect on ratings of responsibility than 
did below average intent. Whereas, in the case of failure, effects at 
each of the three levels of the intention variable appeared to be of 
comparable strength. 
Effort x Outcome Interaction 
Table 10 shows that the effort x outcome interaction (ExOt) was 
significant. This significant relationship indicates that the differ-
ences which exist in the ascriptions of responsibility for the various 
stimulus stories were influenced by the descriptions of the child's 
effort that were presented i n the stories as well as by the outcome of 
the event. Table 11 (B) gi ves the mean responsibility rating for the 
three levels of effort and the two types of outcome. 
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In order to interpret the interaction, a simple effects test of 
outcome at the three levels of effort was performed, The results are 
presented in Table 14. 
Source 
Effort: 
Above Average 
Average 
Below Average 
Error 
TABLE 14 
ANOVA Summary Table: Simple Effects of 
Outcome at Three Levels of Effort 
Sum of Degrees ·of Mean 
Squares Freedom Square 
372.2362 1 372.2362 
75.8348 1 75.8348 
86.237 1 86.237 
204 2.415 
F 
154.135 * 
31.4016* 
35.7089* 
These results indicate that the outcome of the event had a significant 
effect upon ratings of responsibility for all three levels of effort: 
a) above average effort, F(l,204) = 154.135, p<.01; b) average effort, 
F(l,204) = 31.4016, p<.01; and c) below average effort, F(l,204) = 
35.7089, p<.01. A comparison of the F ratios suggests that although 
outcome effects were significant at each of the three levels of effort, 
the magnitude of the effect was not equivalent across the three levels. 
The greatest effect was evident with those stories where the child had 
demonstrated much more effort than the other children in the class. 
Effects for average and below average effort appear to be of essentially 
. equal magnitude, though of opposite direction. These effects are 
illustrated in Figure 7. 
The results of the simple effects test of effort at the two 
levels of outcome are presented in Table 15. 
Source 
Outcome: 
TABLE 15 
ANOVA Sunnnary Table: Simple Effects of 
Effort at Two Levels of Outcome 
Sum of Degrees of Mean 
Squares Freedom Square 
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F 
Pass 177.5697 2 88.785 69.7995 
Fail 242.513 2 121. 2565 95.327 
Error 272 1.272 
These results indicate that the relative level of effort of the child 
that was stated in the stories significantly affected the rating of 
responsibility with both passing outcome, F(2,272) = 69.7995, p<.01; 
and, failing outcome, F(2,272) = 95.327, p<.01. 
Thus it can be seen that increased levels of effort of the child 
in the story served to increase the degree to which the child was con-
sidered to be responsible for succeeding at a task. Decreasing levels 
of effort of the child in the stories served to increase the degree to 
which the child was held accountable for the failure. 
In order to examine the source of the effort effects, a Newman-
Keuls Multiple Comparison Test was performed for both passing outcome 
and failing outcome. These results indicate that for passing outcome, 
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AVERAGE 
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Figure 7. Ratings of responsibilit y for positive and negative outcome 
as a function of effort. 
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a statement of above average effort was most highly influential and 
produced ratings of responsibility that were significantly greater than 
those produced by statements of either average or below average effort, 
p<.01. In addition, a statement of average effort produced ratings of 
responsibility that were significantly greater than those for below 
average effort, p<.01. For failing outcome, a statement of below aver-
age effort produced significantly greater ratings of responsibility than 
those produced by statements of either average or above average effort, 
p<.01. 
The relative effect of effort on teachers' ratings was examined 
by means of trend analyses. The results of the test of trend for posi-
tive outcome revealed a quadratic relationship between the effort of the 
student and the responsibility ratings, F(l,272) = 11.3426, p<.01. As 
illustrated in Figure 7, when outcome was that of passing, the increased 
degree of responsibility of above average effort over average effort 
(mean difference= .4722) was less than the decreased degree of responsi-
bility of below average effort beneath average effort (mean difference= 
.7964). The results of the test of trend for negative outcome revealed 
a quadratic relationship between the relative effort of the student and 
the degree of responsibility attributed to the student, F(l,272) = 
16.3349, p<.01. As illustrated in Figure 7, the increased degree of 
responsibility of .below average effort over the degree of responsibility 
for average effort (mean difference= .9353) was greater than the 
decreased degree of responsibility of above average effort in comparison 
with average effort (mean difference= .5464). 
For the purpose of contrasting the differential effects of effort 
and intention, the intention x outcome results and the effort x outcome 
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results which were presented in Table 11 are illustrated in Figures 6 
and 7. An examination of the data presented reveals that in the case of 
positive outcome, the decreasing trend in ascriptions of responsibility 
from above average effort to average effort is enhanced as effort 
decreases from average to below average whereas the decreasing trend 
associated with intention as it moves from above average to average is 
not enhanced as intention decreases from average to below average but 
instead is diminished. Similarly, in the case of negative outcome, the 
increasing trend in ascription of responsibility for failure that 
accompanies decreasing ,levels of effort is enhanced as the level of 
effort moves from average to below average, while the increase in the 
ascription of responsibility for failure that accompanies a decrease 
from above ·average to average intention is diminished. 
Correlation: Evaluative Judgments and 
Responsibility Ascriptions 
Pearson correlation coefficients were calculated between the 
absolute values of the evaluative judgments made to the stimulus stories 
and the ascriptions of responsibility to the same stories. The evalua-
tive judgments were originally rated by the teachers from -5 to +S, but 
the signs were removed for this correlation. The reason for using the 
absolute value instead of the original ratings was to make it possible 
to examine the relationship between the degree to which a child was 
held responsible for an outcome and the intensity, regardless of sign, 
of the evaluation of that child; that is, to determine for each of the 
stories whether children held to be considerably responsible would 
receive ratings close to +5.0 for positive evalua t ions or close to -5.0 
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for negative ratings; and, whether children held not at all responsible 
for an event would receive relatively neutral (near zero) evaluations. 
Correlations were calculated separately for each of the eighteen 
individual situation stories and for each of the eighteen group situa-
tion stories to determine whether a teacher's evaluative judgment for a 
given story corresponded to the teacher's responsibility rating for that 
story. These results are presented in Table 16. Only three of the 
thirty six correlation coefficients departed significantly from zero, 
(p<.05). There was no consistent direction or pattern present in this 
set of correlations. Values ranged from i:,;, -.4891 tor= .3914. The 
median value for these correlations was very close to zero: .0976. 
Since three rejections of the null hypothesis is approximately what 
could be expected by chance alone, it appears that no meaningful 
relationship exists between a subject's responses on the two dependent 
measures within any of the separate conditions. 
Another manner of assessing the relationship bet1veen ascriptions 
of responsibility and evaluative judgments was to examine the corres-
pondence between each subject's general tendency to hold children 
responsible for the outcome of events he/she evaluated and his/her 
tendency to give more or less ex~reme evaluations. Rank order correla-
tions ~ ere therefore calculated . between mean responsibility ratings and 
mean absolute evaluations were calculated separately for each of the 
four between group variable conditions for the 18 subjects in each 
condition: (IER) Rho= .3105, (IRE) Rho= .147, (GER) Rho= .206, 
(GRE) Rho= .164. None of these four correlations reached the .OS 
level of significance. 
*p<.05 
TABLE 16 
Corr .elations Between Responsibility Ratings and Absolute · 
Evaluative Judgments for Each of Eighteen Conditions 
in Individual and Group Situations 
Condition Situation 
I E 0 Individual Group 
1 1 1 .2855 .2411 
1 1 2 -.2747 -.2085 
1 2 1 .0964 -.1211 
1 2 2 -.2295 -.0874 
1 3 1 -.2295 .1406 
I 3 2 .0667 .0Z96 
2 1 1 -.0213 · .1970 
" 
2 1 2 -.4891* -.1712 
2 2 1 .0064 .1148 
2 2 2 -.2019 .0477 
2 3 1 .1579 -.0375 
2 3 2 .1914 .3457 
3 1 1 .1662 .3590* 
3 1 2 -.1092 .1605 
3 2 1 .0988 .1067 
3 2 2 -.1275 .1873 
3 3 1 -.1177 -.0645 
3 3 2 .3914* .2568 
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While there was no significant relationship found either between 
the actual ratings of responsibility and the evaluations made by the 72 
subjects for each of the thirty six separate conditions, or between a 
subject's tendency to hold different children responsible and the 
subject's tendency to make extreme evaluations across situations, there 
were strong similarities between the overall pattern of responsibility 
ascriptions and the overall pattern of evaluations in the mean scores. 
That is, the treatment effects had a similar pattern for both dependent 
measures. From this parallel it seemed likely that there was a parallel 
sensitivity of the two dependent measures to the experimental manipu-
lations. The rank order comparison of these effects (Rho= .850) is 
presented in Table 17. 
Part 1. 
Condition 
IEO 
111 
112 
121 
122 
131 
132 
211 
212 
221 
222 
231 
232 
311 
312 
TABLE 17 
Rank Order for Mean Scores of Absolute Evaluative 
Judgments and Responsibility Ascriptions 
for All Groups 
Individual Situation 
Order 
E:R R:E 
Rank E Rank R D Rank E Rank R 
3 2 1 4 1 
53 59 6 48 69 
a 10.5 2.5 21 14 
42 54 12 65 56.5 
50.5 41.5 9 62 36.5 
29.5 36.5 7 25.5 26 
5 10.5 5.5 11 10.5 
48 64 16 46 64 
29.5 28.5 1 35 26 
38 48.5 10.5 60 36.5 
58 56.5 2.5 63.5 56.5 
31.5 22.5 9 25.5 6 
11 18.5 7.5 15 6 
72 52.5 19.5 44 68 
D 
3 
21 
7 
8.5 
25.5 
.5 
.5 
18 
9 
23.5 
7 
18.5 
9 
24 
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TABLE 17 - Continued 
Order 
E:R R:E 
Condition Rank E Rank R D Rank E Rank R D 
321 23.5 36.5 13 34 28.5 5.5 
322 42 47 5 70 39.5 30.5 
331 70 50.5 19.5 39.5 60.5 21 
332 36 33 3 18 4 14 
Part 2. Group Situation 
Order 
E:R R:E 
Condition Rank E Rank R D Rank E Rank R D 
IEO 
111 1 3 2 2 10.5 8.5 
112 57 70 13 48 71 23 
121 15 16 1 17 22.5 5.5 
122 53 52.5 .5 60 60.5 .5 
131 50.5 34 16.5 55.5 48.5 7 
132 23.5 32 8.5 19 22.5 3.5 
211 6 8 2 7 14 7 
212 60 66.5 6 67 72 5 
221 27.5 18.5 9 21 31 10 
222 39.5 45 5.5 55.5 64 8.5 
231 45 41.5 3.5 70 56.5 13.5 
232 31.5 26 5.5 21 17 4. 
311 13 14 1 9 20 11 
312 53 62 9 67 66.5 .5 
321 27.5 30 2.5 33 39.5 6.5 
322 37 44 7 42 43 1 
331 63.5 46 17.5 67 50.5 16.5 
332 11 22.5 11.5 15 6 9 
Thus, responsibility ascriptions and evaluative judgments were affected 
in very much the same manner by the stimulus cues. These data suggest 
that the two dependent measures are therefore related in some way. 
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IV. DISCUSSION 
The primary purpose of this dissertation was to examine evalua-
tive judgments and ascriptions of personal responsibility of upper level 
elementary school teachers to the academic performance of pupils. The 
major focus of the research was to investigate the effects of specific 
situational and motivational causal cues, particularly the differential 
effects of intention and effort, on such evaluative judgments and 
responsibility ascriptions. Another major aspect of the current study 
was an analysis of the relationship between evaluations and attributions 
of responsibility. Because of the quantity and complexity of the 
results to be discussed, this chapter will be organized in three sec-
tions: 1) interpretations of the evaluative judg~ents, 2) interpretations 
of the responsibility ascriptions, and 3) interpretation of the relation-
ship between evaluations and responsibility ascriptions. 
Evaluative Judgments 
There were 010 types of independent variables included in this 
study. These were situational variables and motivational variables. On 
the basis of previous research only one of the variables in this study, 
locus of outcome consequence, would be defined as a situational 
variable. However, since the success or failure of an outcome truly 
defines the class of situation being judged, rather than being a class 
of cau:;al cue, outcome will be discussed here as a situational variable ,. 
The intention and effort variables will be discussed together as moti-
vational variables. 
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Situational Effects 
It was hypothesized that whether the outcome of an event was a 
success or failure would significantly affect evaluative judgments. As 
anticipated, it was found that overall evaluative judgments for success 
were positive while overall evaluative judgments for failure were nega-
tive. These results are consistent with previous research (Weiner, 
1974b) and were anticipated with considerable certainty. There is an 
obvious relationship between teaching goals, such as skill acquisition 
or academic excellence, and a teacher's reaction to or evaluation of 
passing versus failing performance. 
A subtler and perhaps more interesting question that was examined 
here was whether the locus of outcome consequence (i.e., who was 
affected by the outcome) would influence evaluative judgments. This 
question which has emerged from a consideration of a number of prior 
research studies remains unanswered. Weiner and Peter (1973) had found 
that the importance of motivational cues for the evaluation of children 
differed according to the type of task depicted in the stimulus stories, 
that is, whether the child was described as working on an individually 
assigned classroom task, or as being asked to help a lost child. On 
the basis of their results, Weiner and Peter concluded that two differ-
ent causal attribution systems were employed on the basis of whether an 
achievement or a moral situation was being judged. 
Parsons (1974) however pointed out several serious criticisms of 
the Weiner and Peter study. Since moral components and achievement 
components are both inherent in any task, the differential effects 
obtained by Weiner and Peter could not entirely be attributed to a 
moral versus achievement dichotomy. Instead, Parsons suggested that 
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these effects were related to two variables that confounded the moral 
and the achievement stories: the competitiveness versus noncompetitive-
ness of the task and the social versus asocial context of the task. 
Specifically, Parsons suggested that the competitiveness of the task 
would reflect its importance and affect the use of outcome information, 
while the social context would reflect whether the individual was con-
cerned about the welfare of others and would affect the use of motiva-
tional cues. She sought to separate these dimensions explicitly and 
found that while the importance of the motivational cues differed 
according to the competitiveness of the task, the use of these cues did 
not differ according to the social context of the task. 
It should be noted that the social context of the stimulus 
materials was defined by Parsons in terms of the social intent and 
social consideration of the target subject in the stimulus stories 
rather than by any obvious or identifiable element of the situation 
being judged. That is, a situation was defined as social if the target 
individual's intention had explicit social implications. For example, 
a positive social story involved a desire to help a friend or to help 
someone's team win. A situation was defined as asocial when the actor's 
intentions had no social implications. For example, a positive asocial 
story involved the individual's desire to win a game or a sports event, 
or the desire to prevent some object from being ruined with no direct 
concern for the feelings of the owner of the object. A more direct way 
to define the social context, however, would be in conjunction with the 
final outcome of the event and its social versus asocial context. For 
example, a social situation would be one in which there is some actual 
involvement . of others in a particular activity or in which the effects 
-or outcome of the event or action in some way impinge upon other indi-
viduals in addition to the target actor. 
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Silverstein (1977) extended the investigation of situational 
effects by examining the importance of locus of outcome consequence, 
that is whether the outcome affected someone other than the actor or 
whether the actor alone was involved. The results of Silverstein's 
research suggest that the differential evaluation of degree of perceived 
motivation was enhanced when outcome also affected individuals other 
than the actor. However, Silverstein's stimulus stories varied not only 
on locus of outcome consequence but also on the type, and perhaps 
importance, of the task, and also on degree of responsibility of an 
actor for the outcome. As a result, interpretations drawn from the 
aforementioned result must be stated cautiously. 
In order to clarify the source of the situational effects re-
ported by Parsons (1974) and Silverstein (1977) the stimulus materials 
used in this study varied locus of outcome consequence for a single type 
·' of task, a class project. Based upon the suggestions from previous 
research it was anticipated that locus of outcome consequence would be 
a salient cue and would affect evaluative judgments of the students in 
the stimulus stories. Specifically, it was hypothesized that positive 
evaluations for success and negative evaluations for failure would be 
enhanced when effects were to another individual as well as to the actor 
being judged. The data however, did not support this prediction. In 
this study, individual locus of outcome consequence and group locus of 
outcome consequence did not yield significantly different evaluations. 
There are several explanations possible for the absence of any 
outcome consequences effect in this study. It could be suggested that 
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locus of consequence is indeed a salient cue in the natural environment 
and that the absence of an experimental affect on the dependent varia-
bles of the current study is merely an insensitivity of the design or of 
the stimulus materials employed. Alternatively the basis for the 
absence of experimental effects might be that the locus of outcome 
consequence is not an important determinant of the utilization of moti-
vational cues in the evaluation process. Thus it may be that the re-
sults previously reported by Silverstein (1977) were the result of some 
other feature of the situational variable manipulated rather than 
whether others were affected by the outcome. 
The current study utilized a single task where children were 
required to complete class projects. In the individual condition the . 
outcome consequence (being able to go on a class trip or not being able 
to go on a class trip) only affected the target child. In the group 
condition the outcome consequence of the class trip affected the entire 
class as well as the target child. That is, for the individual effect, 
if a child failed the assignment he or she had to forfeit a class trip; 
whereas, for the group effect, if a child failed the assignment the 
entire class would forfeit the class trip. A number of . the teachers 
who were subjects in the study made written comments on the data sheets, 
and several indicated to the experimenter that they were philosophically 
opposed to a condition in which a whole class suffered the consequences 
brought on by a single child and that they would never permit such 
consequences to occur in their classrooms. Since any class trip would 
be for educational purposes and not for the purpose of reward, no class 
trip would be cancelled or postponed as the result of passing or failing 
performance of any or all of the children in the class. On the basis of 
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these comments, it may be argued that the teachers who made such 
comments, (and by implication the other teachers in the sample) dis-
counted or ignored the group locus of consequence information. Thus it 
may be that teachers merely looked at the behavior of the target student 
and evaluated the outcome for that student, disregarding any statements 
about the consequence to others because they felt that such statements 
were unrealistic or invalid. If this were the case, evaluations of both 
the individual and the group situations would be based upon identical 
stimulus stories with outcome affecting only the target student and 
would produce no significant differences. Moreover, if the different 
effects reported by Silverstein (1977) were indeed related to locus of 
outcome consequence rather than to type or importance of the task (test 
vs. group project), then the results of the current study would be 
expected to parallel the results obtained previously for individual 
consequences and the current results should not be comparable with those 
previously obtained for group consequences. An anal ysis of Silverstein's 
(1977) results indicates that the pattern of effects obtained for indi-
vidual consequences was quite distinct from the pattern of effects 
obtained for group consequences. The effects of effort on evaluations 
of the individual consequences were demonstrated by a linear trend 
showing that for such tasks teachers were as concerned by both above 
average and below average effort, whereas, the effects of effort for 
group consequences were demonstrated by a quadratic trend, showing that 
the teachers were more aff .ected by below average than above average 
effort. A comparison made between the pattern of results that were ob-
tained in this study and the patterns obtained by Silverstein indicates 
that the current results for both outcome contingencies fail to corres-
pond with the previousl y obtained pattern of results for individual 
consequences (test task). Instead, the current results for both the 
individual outcome consequence for a class project and for the group 
outcome consequence for a class project more closel y resemble the 
pattern of results which Silverstein reported for group consequences 
(project task). That is, teachers were more affected by below average 
than average effort. Therefore, it appears that previously reported 
effects of locus of outcome consequence may have been the result of 
differences in the types of stimulus tasks employed, i.e. test versus 
project, rather than a reliable effect of the locus of outcome conse-
quences variable. 
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The results of the current study thus do not support 
Silverstein's (1977) claim that locus of outcome consequence is a 
salient situational cue for the process of making evaluative judgments. 
What is needed to clarify the source of the effect is an examination of 
the potential effect of locus of outcome consequences through a con-
trolled use of a single situation that has validity for classroom 
teachers. An example of such a study would be one that employed 
stimulus stories depicting a single cooperative group project task. The 
individual locus of outcome consequence could be reflected in a situa-
tion where a child, after participating in the class learning experience 
was required to produce an individual project such as a drawing for 
display or a presentation to the class. The group locus of outcome 
consequence could be reflected in a situation where a child, after 
participating in the class learning experience, was required to produce 
an individual project as part of a group project such as a mural for 
display or a group presentation to the class. In this proposed study 
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the outcome consequence would be directly tied to the target child's 
performance, That is, in the individual situation, the child's 
satisfactory or unsatisfactory completion of the assignment would 
directly impinge upon the quality of the group's product and would 
therefore affect other children. Since the effects would not be under 
the teacher's control and would not be such an obvious punishment to the 
class as the group effects in the cur .rent study were perceived to be, 
this proposed representation of the locus of outcome consequence varia-
ble may be considered to be more valid by the teachers . . In any case, 
more systematic study is necessary in order for the effects of this and 
other situational cues to be clarified. 
Motivational Effects 
A major premise of attribution theory is that evaluative judg-
ments are not based solely upon the observable and objectively measure-
able aspects of the outcome of an event, but they are instead based upon 
the evaluator's perceptions of the causes of the event. The motivation 
of an individual to perform an act is one of the aspects of an event to 
which causality may be attributed. Reider's (1958) theoretical analysis 
of motivation, which serves as a cornerstone for Weiner's (1974b) 
attribution model of achievement, states that there are two major types 
of motivational cues which are used by an observer in order to interpret 
an event and to understand its causes. These two types of .motivational 
cues are the intention of the individual to perform an action and the 
effort expended by the individual toward accomplishment of the action. 
Bolles (1972) discussed the meaning of motivational cues for the 
interpretation of behavior and for the prediction of future actions. 
83 
Individuals believe themselves and others to be free to act and thus 
believe that individuals are responsible for their actions. When making 
evaluations of themselves and others, individuals search for cues that 
will help them to understand whether the actor behaved freely and with 
purpose or whether the actor was in some way forced to behave as he did. 
Evaluations are then based upon whether the actor behaved with intent or 
under constraint. There are logico-philosophical arguments against 
this traditional view of individuals as free beings, which, as Bolles 
points out, suggest that freedom to act and purposive or will controlled 
behavior is a fallacy. However, freedom to act and self direction are 
components of naive implicit theories of causality which indiv;i..duals 
do utilize to interpret and to predict the actions of others. As such, 
beliefs about motivational control affect evaluations of acts even if 
such control is not an "objective" reality in terms of causing or 
changing behaviors. 
As was noted in an earlier chapter Reider's "naive theory of 
action" describes distinctions between the informational value of 
intention cues and the informational value of effort cues. The experi-
mental investigations of causal attributions and achievement evaluation 
has not, however, adequately investigated the role of intentionality 
cues; and, has instead frequently confounded effort with intention. A 
major goal of this study was the analysis of differential motivational 
effects on evaluative judgments; and, a unique aspect of this research 
was the systematic investigation of the differences in evaluation 
generated by intentionality cues as opposed to effort cues. Based upon 
the theoretical roots of the attribution model, it was predicted that 
both intention cues and effort cues would significantly affect the 
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evaluations which teachers made of the students depicted in the stimulus 
stories. 
Specifically, it was hypothesized that positive evaluations would 
be related to an increased degree of perceived intent to perform, and 
that more positive evaluations would be related to an increased amount 
of perceived effort expenditure. The results indicated that both classes 
of motivational cues did produce significant effects on evaluative judg-
ments. An observor's perceptions of the intention and effort of an 
individual were used discriminatively to make evaluations of the outcome 
of the event. The results obtained for intention and those obtained for 
effort will be discussed separately below. 
Intention Effects 
The data showed a significant main effect of intention, and a 
significant interaction between intention and outcome. That is, the 
experimental levels of the intention variable produced significant 
effects on evaluative judgments; and, the pattern of these effects 
varied according to the outcome of the event. It was found that in 
stories depicting a child who had successfully completed the assigned 
task, teachers utilized the intention cues so that evaluations were more 
positive as a function of relatively greater intent to perfQrm. How-
ever, in stories depicting a child who was unsuccessful at completing 
the assigned task, differences in evaluations as a function of relative 
intent to perform were negligible. Thus, when the child performed 
satisfactorily, the intention attributed to the child affected the way 
the teacher evaluated the child and the event. However, when the child 
did not perform satisfactorily, the intention attributed to the child 
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had no bearing on the evaluation of the child. 
The salience of intention cues in the case of success but not in 
the case of failure had not been anticipated. Instead, it had been 
predicted that intention cues would be utilized both in the case of 
success and in the case of failure. The basis for this hypothesis was 
Reider's premise that information about intention is used to assign 
causal responsibility. It would follow from Reider's theory that 
decisions about responsibility, and thus the analysis of intentionality, 
would have an important effect on the evaluation of both success and 
failure. 
Kelley (1967) and Weiner and Peter (1973) suggested that differ-
ential evaluation based upon outcome is related to societal sanctions 
and the expectations for certain behaviors that are based upon . these 
sanctions. That is, there are certain behaviors which are governed 
by societal or moral codes and to which all individuals within a 
society must try to conform. When an observor views another person who 
is adhering to the rules and performing in accordance with the norm, the 
observor does not have to look for explanations of the behavior. The 
obvious explanation of social constraint is assumed. In such a situa-
tion the individual who behaves appropriately will be viewed in a posi-
tive light but since the demand of the societal constraint is so strong 
the person's intent to perform would be discounted. That is, since the 
individual must achieve the demanded result or suffer social conse-
quences, his motivation to do what is right is expected and therefore is 
not particularly noteworthy. 
From this point of view, the only behaviors which are analyzed 
more deeply would be those that deviate from the expectancy. Only when 
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a sanction is broken would an observer be compelled to assess the 
various components of a situation in an attempt to understand why the 
outcome was not governed by social constraints. In this case the 
observer would seek to determine whether the actor caused the outcome or 
whether some other factor was responsible. This decision of causal 
responsibility would dramatically effect the evaluation of the indi-
vidual by guiding the extent to which the individual was punished for 
breaking or ignoring the social constraints or the extent to which the 
individual was excused of responsibility for the result. Bolles (1972) 
identified intentionality as that class of motivational cues that is 
called upon to explain deviations from societal constraints and to allow 
for social consequences for the deviations. 1.fuen an actor's intention 
does not adhere to social rules, the actor can be held accountable for 
the result. However, when the actor's intention does conform to the 
social codes, the power of the rule is viewed as the controlling factor 
in the situation, and the actor's intent is considered to be secondary. 
These explanations can be used as a basis for examining differ-
ential outcome effects obtained in the current study. The equivalent 
of the moral or social constraint of the classroom situation would be 
the expectation and demand for success. It would also be feasible to 
predict that conformity with the demand, or receiving a passing grade, 
would result in relatively low positive evaluations; and, since the 
cause of success would be the result of the rule or the constraint, it 
would be expected that the positive evaluations would be consistent 
across the degree of intent. Since the intent of the actor would not be 
necessary for explaining the outcome, it would not be salient for 
evaluating the outcome. Similarly, it would follow that when the 
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outcome deviated from the expected or demanded level, such as when a 
child receives a failing grade, the observer would rely upon intent cues 
to determine the individual's responsibility for the outcome. In this 
case, evaluations should differ on the basis of intent. 
This explanation, however, is completely contradictory to the 
results obtained, since the operation of constraints to succeed in 
school should be expected to inhibit the utilization of intention cues 
with success and to maximize their use with failure. If the suggested 
operation of intention in the evaluation process is assumed to be valid, 
and the results of this study are interpreted accordingly, then it would 
seem to follow that children are not constrained by a norm to succeed in 
school. Rather, teachers seem to be evaluating on the basis of an 
expectancy for failure. It could then be argued that teachers appear to 
accept failure without needing to find explanations for it. Similarly, 
if the teachers did not anticipate success they would search for explana-
tions according to other factors such as motivation. Although this 
argument can be made to fit the form of Kelley's (1967) constraint 
hypothesis it does not make sense in terms of obvious educational values. 
A more "face valid" alternative is needed to explain the results 
obtained. The following suggestion is based upon written comments made 
by some of the teachers on the data sheets. School success is very 
important and is the expected outcome for all children. Teachers of 
elementary grades are quite concerned with the success of their students 
and assume responsibility for ensuring the success of each student in 
their classes. The teacher tries to make certain that each child is 
given work only at the level that he or she can complete, that each 
child fully understands the assignment, and that each child is provided 
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with the assistance necessary for success. The teacher also assumes 
responsibility for motivating the children, for stimulating their 
imagination and for setting up the tasks so that the children will want 
to learn and will want to succeed. If a child fails, the responsibility 
rests to a greater extent with the teacher, than with the child. 
Although a child who failed might be evaluated less positively because 
the teacher was disappointed with the performance, the child's inten-
tions or lack of interest should not be the primary factor used to ex-
plain the failure or to determine the locus of responsibility. Intent 
cues could be utilized however, in the case of success to enhance a 
collll11endation because (:j_f the teacher is providing the materials and 
stimulation that would be sufficient to ensure the success of his/her 
students) any additional demonstration of intent to do well on the part 
of the students is beyond what the teacher expects. 
This interpretation of the results is much more consistent with 
educational values and philosophies than is an alternative interpreta-
tion which assumes an expectancy of failure. In addition, an examina-
tion of responsibility ascriptions obtained in the current study lends 
some support to this interpretation. The children were indeed held less 
responsible for failure than they were for success, although intention 
cues did affect responsibility ascriptions for both success and failure. 
The fact that intention based differences in responsibility ascriptions 
made in the case of failure did not produce similar differences in 
evaluation of failure is a very important clue to the operation of 
responsibility ascription as a mediator of evaluation. While this one 
piece of information can not illuminate the complete relationship 
between evaluation and responsibilit y , it does demonstrate the 
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oversimplicity of Weiner's model and of attribution theory in general. 
That is, there does not appear to be a direct relationship here between 
the effects of intention on responsibility ascriptions for failure and 
the effects of intention on evaluation. This will be addressed again 
at a later point in this discussion. 
Effort Effects 
It was assumed that effort would be a major cue for determining 
evaluations; and, this prediction was confirmed. The data indicated a 
significant main effect of effort, as well as significant interactions 
between effort and outcome and between effort and order. That is, the 
experimental levels of the effort variable produced significant effects 
on evaluative judgments, and the pattern of these effects was altered 
by the outcome of the event and by the order of obtaining the evalua-
tions or the responsibility ascriptions. In general, it was found that 
for both passing and failing outcome the degree to which teachers' 
evaluations were affected by the level of effort was significantly 
greater between average and below average effort than between average 
and above average effort; and, the greater differential effect of below 
average effort was enhanced in the case of success. It was also found 
that statements of effort had significant effects on evaluative judg-
ments both when the evaluations were made first and when the evaluations 
were made subsequent to decisions about personal causal responsibility 
of the student for the outcome. However, when evaluations were made 
after responsibility had been attributed, the effects were enhanced. 
An analysis of the data shows effort to be a non-linear variable. 
That is, the effects were not equivalent across those levels of effort 
. that were depicted in the stimulus stories. A greater difference was 
found between the evaluation of average and below average effort than 
between average and above average effort. That is, using average as a 
point of reference, it appears that teachers were more negatively 
affected by a demonstration of below average effort than they were 
positively affected by a demonstration of above average effort. 
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The attribution model suggests that evaluations are directly or 
indirectly based upon expectancies which the observor may derive from 
past experiences or from the social norm. In addition, the model also 
postulates that deviations from the expected or from the norm would be 
attributed to the individual rather than to situational constraints, and 
would be given more extreme evaluations (Kelley, 1967). On the basis of 
this model, it would be predicted that low effort would elicit more 
negative evaluations than high effort would elicit positive evaluations, 
if the ,expected norm for school related tasks is that children put 
forth high effort to succeed. Hopefully, it would also be the past 
experience of most of the teachers in this study that their students 
have, indeed, put forth effort to complete assignments. 
Silverstein (1977) obtained this same pattern of results for the 
effort variable in the group project situation but not in the individual 
test situation. While the particular pattern of effort effects are 
easily explained by the general attribution model, this effect may be 
tied to the class of task used here. That is, this same pattern of 
effects may not emerge for tasks other than group projects in the class-
room and the pattern of effort effects may vary as a function of the 
type of task or of the perceived importance of the task. Before this 
pattern of effects can be generalized to the full range of classroom 
assignments or school behaviors, a more complete range of tasks or 
assignments must be examined experimentally. 
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An analysis of the effort x outcome interaction indicates that 
the relatively greater influence of below average effort occurred for 
both successful and unsuccessful outcome; however, the effect was more 
pronounced when the child received a passing grade than when the child 
received a failing grade. In fact, the range of evaluations from below 
average through above average was wider for stories involving success 
than for stories involving failure, as was the case with the intention 
variable. 
This effort x outcome effect was not hypothesized and, like the 
intention · x - outcome interaction, it can not be incorporated easily 
into the attribution model. As was suggested earlier the teachers may 
hold themselves to be responsible for the failure of their students 
while holding the students responsible for the successes. If this is 
the case then it would follow that teachers would be more likely to 
alter their evaluations of success on the basis of the chi.ldts effort 
than they would be to alter their evaluations of failure. As was sug-
gested in the interpre_tation of intention effects, teachers need to look 
for the causes of events that are outside of what would be expected by 
social constraints. If failure is primarily the responsibility of the 
teacher rather than of the child, then when a child fails the motivation 
of the child is of secondary concern and importance. However, since 
hard work is valued, the child would still be expected to attempt the 
task, regardless of its difficulty. Evaluations of effort in the case 
of failure would not be as extreme as evaluations of effort in the case 
of success because the failure may be shared by both the teacher and the 
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child while the success is attributed to the child. An analysis of the 
results for responsibility ascriptions tends to support this suggestion 
since teachers held students less accountable for failure than for 
success. However, it must be noted that effort cues were influential 
in altering responsibility ascripti~ns for both success and failure 
outcomes - albeit in opposite directions. Thus the picture relating 
ascription of responsibility in this situation to evaluation of 
different levels of effort is clearly a very complex one - and will be 
addressed in a later section of the discussion. Before more compre-
hensive explanations of this result can be put forth, additional 
research needs to be conducted to support the reliability, generaliza-
bility, and limits of the effect. 
An examination of the effects of effort on evaluations for the 
two orders of presentation reveals that the general pattern of results 
for effort was apparent in both orders. However, the effects were 
magnified when evaluations were made after the subjects had assigned 
the degree of causal responsibility for the students in the stories . 
Thus, it appears that for those subjects who were given a cue to the 
responsibility of the student in the story before making evaluations, 
the effort variable became more salient. This effect will be discussed 
in greater detail in a subsequent section of this chapter which will 
deal with the relationship between evaluative judgments and responsi-
bility ascriptions. 
-Differential Effects of Intention and Effort 
on Evaluative Judgments 
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Investigations of causal attribution and evaluative judgments 
have failed to examine differential intention and effort effects despite 
suggestions by Heider (1958) that these two types of motivational cues 
provide distinct information. Instead information about intentions and 
effort has been confounded in the stimulus materials that have been 
utilized. In order to clarify the components of the attribution model, 
the differences between these cues must be systematically examined. If 
intention cues are indeed distinct from effort cues then it would be 
expected that these cues would produce different and distinct effects on 
evaluative judgments. The results of this study indicated that the 
effects produced by intention were different from the effects produced 
by effort at least to some extent. 
One of the major differences between intention and effort was the 
strength of the effect. An examination of the F ratios shows that the 
main effect of effort was considerably greater than the main effect of 
intention. Thus, it would appear that the evaluative judgments were 
influenced more by the perceived degree of the child's effort than by 
the perceived degree of the child's intent. Perhaps intention provides 
a teacher with some understanding of the causes of the final outcome, 
but since effort is more easily observable in the natural environment of 
school, teachers may habitually consider effort to be more substantial 
class of cue and thus be more certain about effects that effort would 
have than the effects that intention would have. If this was the case 
then it would follow that effort would exert a greate.r influence on 
teachers' evaluations of the stories than would intent. 
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A second substantive difference between intention effects and 
effort effects was in the interaction of these two types of cues with 
the outcome of the event. The interaction between outcome and both 
intention and effort was such that evaluations were more affected by the 
motivational cues in the case of success than in the case of failure. 
Differences between the evaluation of passing as opposed to failing 
outcome, however, was most pronounced when the intention of the student 
was above average, wherea .s the strongest effort effect occurred for the 
case of below average • . There are several possible explanations for 
this result. For example, it may be that these effects mirror different 
expectancies on the part of the teachers. Teachers may expect only 
minimal positive intentions from their students and thus do not respond 
with an extreme evaluation when students appear to be less intent on 
doing a good job than most of the other students in the class. In con-
trast, teachers may be pleasantly surprised by the student who is very 
intent on doing a good job and be inclined to give more extreme 
positive evaluations. However, teachers may expect at least average or 
better effort from their students regardless of the task difficulty or 
the final outcome and respond minimally to the expected high effort 
while responding with more extreme evaluations for the unexpected case 
of below average effort. 
Another interpretation for the different interaction wit~ outcome 
may be related to teachers' beliefs about the contribution of the factor 
to the outcome. For example, if teachers suspect that a strong positive 
intention can influence an outcome by facilitating success, then they 
may reward such intentions because they have been causal. If the 
teachers also suspect that below average intention will not lead to 
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poorer performance than average intent then they would not respond much 
differently to the below average intent information than they would to 
average intent information. In contrast, teachers may believe that 
while either average or above average effort will result in success, 
the most important contributing factor to failure is below average 
effort. Therefore the teachers would give more extreme evaluations to 
the student exhibiting below average effort. This explanation suggests 
that the teachers were responding to the two cues on the basis of 
whether the evaluation can alter future behavior. If a teacher 
believes that there is no way to change the undesireable intentions of 
students then the teacher would not be likely to give an extreme evalua-
tion to such students. The teacher may believe, however, that a posi-
tive evaluation can sustain good intentions. On the other hand, the 
teachers may believe that a negative evaluation will serve to alter the 
effort that a child will expend and thus be inclined to give an extreme 
evaluation for such performance. 
There is another explanation for the differential interactions 
of intention and effort with outcome which may be the least speculative 
and most plausible alternative. This involves the degree of certainty 
of the teachers in their inferences about the two factors. An examina-
tion of Figure 3 (page 50) reveals that for passing and for failing 
outcome, the evaluations of average and above average intent are less 
positive but nearly parallel to those for average and above average 
effort. The major difference occurs at the point of below average 
intent and effort, where the values for effort drop significantl y from 
average to below average but the values for intention hold close to the 
average level. Perhaps the teachers can experience a higher degree of 
certainty that a child has exhibited below average effort than they 
can if a child was less than normally intent on doing a good job. If 
this is so then the teachers would be more willing to use the low 
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effort information to give a less positive evaluation than they would be 
to use the low intention information to give a lowered evaluation. 
A third difference between intention and effort can be seen in 
their interaction with the order of making evaluations and responsi-
bility ascriptions. The data indicated that evaluations of effort were 
more extreme if they were made after responsibility was ascribed, but 
evaluations of intention were not affected by order. There are two 
distinct explanations that could be used to explain those results. 
Perhaps evaluations of intention are implicitly tied to ascriptions of 
responsibility and thus are unaltered by giving the teachers a cue that 
responsibility of the student should be considered. Effort evaluations, 
however, may not be so linked with responsibility. Conversely, it may 
be that evaluations of effort are primary cues for assigning responsi-
bility and that the fact of a subject's being cued to assess responsi-
bility for the events serves to make this factor more salient. The 
significantly stronger overall effects of effort than of intention for 
both responsibility ascriptions and evaluative judgments lends greater 
support to the latter explanation than to the former. It is, however, 
possible to combine the two hypotheses by supposing that "intention" is 
a more abstract motivational ascription than "effort" is, that evidence 
for intentions is typically derived from the empirical display of effort 
and that there is high synonymity between the concepts of nintention" 
and "personal responsibility" only when there are no factual reasons 
(e.g. effort cues and outcome) to contradict the statements of intention. 
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This analysis is in accord with Ryan's (1971) analysis of perceived 
intention and makes sense of the effects of the manipulated variables on 
the responsibility attributions themselves (discussed below). 
There are a number of different possible explanations that can be 
generated from the basic premises of attribution theory to clarify the 
details of the results of this study. However, much additional research 
is necessary before one can specify with exactness the differential 
mechanisms governing the role of intention and effort in the evaluation 
process. 
Responsibility Ascriptions 
Of the body of theoretical and empirical literature generated 
during recent years within the framework of attribution theory, a 
substantial portion is based upon hypotheses about "causal responsi-
bility". Evaluative judgments of events or actions are considered to 
be linked to the observable outcome of the action through the mediation 
of responsibility ascriptions. It is assumed that extreme evaluations 
made by an observer are related to the degree to which the observer 
considers the actor to be responsible and thus accountable for the 
effects of his or her behavior. Thus, purposeful or motivated behavior 
and acts would be evaluated more seriously and extremely than would 
non-motivated or accidental behaviors and acts. 
Heider (1958) has made some specific suggestions regarding which 
causal cues have an effect upon ascriptions of responsibility. 
According to Heider, the perceived intentions or purpose of the indi-
vidual being evaluated are the most salient elements for ascribing 
responsibility to an actor for an event. According to Heider, once an 
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observer determines the responsibility of an actor on the basis of 
intent, then the observer can evaluate the event and respond either 
favorably or unfavorably to the actor. This supposition can be clari-
fied by examining a Piagetian task that is used to assess moral develop-
ment in children. Let us use the example in which an observer enters a 
room just as a child is dropping a tray of tea cups. The attribution 
model would predict that before the observer could evaluate the situa-
tion and respond to the child, the child's intent would have to be 
determined. If, for instance, the child had been trying to help but 
dropped the cups accidentally, the observer probably would not hold the 
child as responsible for the damage nor punish the child to the same 
extent as if the child had broken the cups deliberately in some act of 
anger or upset. 
The development and the tests of attribution theory have rested 
primarily upon the examination of evaluations and upon the implicit 
assumption that responsibility ascriptions were a mediating factor in 
the evaluations. There is, however, little direct evidence to sub-
stantiate the mediational activity of the attributions of responsibility. 
In order to facilitate the development of the attribution model, more 
direct tests must be made of the hypothesis that responsibility ascrip-
tion is based upon intentionality information and that the attribution 
of responsibility once inferred directly affects evaluation. Heider 
(1976) also pointed out the need for testing the underlying assumptions 
of the attribution model and stat~d that "the basis for connecting the 
independent and dependent variables to the manipulation and the measure-
ment is usually some form of 'naive psychology' which is not investi-
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gated and which is taken for granted! ... In so many experiments, 
there are so many explanations possible - because this naive psychology 
has not been thought through clearly" (p. 12). 
The current study attempted to examine the responsibility 
ascriptions which presumably link evaluation with an event. Based upon 
the postulates of attribution theory it was assumed that the motiva-
tional aspects of an event would significantly affect decisions about 
the degree to which an actor was held accountable for the outcome of an 
event. Specifically it was hypothesized that responsibility ascriptions 
would be altered significantly by the specified motivational cues but 
not by the outcome of the event, per se. On the basis of Reider's sys-
tem it was expected that responsibility ascriptions would be affected 
primarily by information about the intent of the individual. The 
results of the statistical analysis revealed a significant main effect 
of outcome on responsibility ascriptions, a significant interaction 
between outcome and intention effects, a significant interaction between 
outcome and effort effects, but . no main effect of either intention or 
effort. This seems to directly contradict the Heider model. These 
three types of effects will be discussed separately below. 
Outcome Effects 
In general, the children depicted in the stimulus stories were 
held to be more responsible for their performance when they received a 
passing grade than when they received a failing grade. This effect of 
outcome on ascriptions of responsibility lends support to the sugges-
tions put forth in the previous discussion of evaluative judgments. 
Teachers in the upper elementary school grades appear to recognize the 
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relatively limited capabilities of their students with respect to school 
achievement. That is, children can not on their own succeed at any task 
that is given to them. Because the students are still developing basic 
reading, mathematical, reasoning, and expressive writing skills, and 
because the students in any given classroom are at different levels of 
skill acquisition, it is the teacher and not the student who has primary 
responsibility for ensuring academic success. Thus when a child fails, 
the teacher can be held accountable to some degree for the failure and 
the child less so. This would be the case in particular when the 
teacher who is making the judgment is not intimately familiar with the 
children, or with the requirements of the class assignment, as in the 
present study. 
A number of the teachers who were subjects in this study 
attempted to explain failure by suggesting that the assignment given to 
the students may not have been clearly presented or that the criteria 
for achievement of a passing grade may have been presented in an 
inadequate way to the students. Because the teachers were not abso-
lutely sure that the failure was related to the performance of the 
child rather than to poor teaching, the subjects could not hold the 
children completely accountable for the outcome of failure. On the 
other hand, if the child did succeed at the task, the teachers did not 
question whether the assignment was too easy or the grading criteria 
too lenient. Apparently, the teachers assumed that the classroom 
teacher had presented the materials adequately and graded the assign-
ments fairly. Thus, if a teacher satisfactorily completed the task of 
providing appropriate instruction and assignments, then the child could 
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be held primarily accountable and responsible for following through with 
the task and thus for receiving a passing grade. That is, in the case 
of failure there may be many more possible explanations for the outcome 
than in the case of success, and the reasons for failure may be 
attributed to causes outside of the child's control to a greater extent 
than are the reasons for success. 
Although the results of this study would suggest that teachers 
of upper elementary level students hold the children less accountable 
for failure than for success, more research is needed to substantiate 
this conclusion. Teachers may, in fact, be very willing to hold the 
students in their own classes to be responsible for failures as well as 
for successes. If the teacher believes that they have indeed performed 
their tasks adequately then they would not tend to believe that the 
assignment was too difficult. If a teacher believes that all children 
are grouped according to their ability levels in the various class 
activities then they would also believe that the children must assume 
responsibility for attaining passing grades on all assignments presented 
to them. Perhaps, in the natural environment of the classroom, a 
teacher would assume principal responsibility for failure only in the 
rare case when an entire group or an entire class failed to meet the 
criteria for a passing grade, rather than when any single child did not 
do. well. This however, remains to be examined. 
Intention x Outcome Effects 
The results of this study indicated that intention of the student 
had significant effects on ascriptions of responsibilit y for both 
passing and failing outcome. Thus, even though students are held to be 
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less responsible for their failures than they are for their successes, 
the teachers discriminated the intentions of the students despite the 
outcome and did consider the intention of the student when determining 
whether the student could be held responsible and accountable for the 
result. The students were considered to be more responsible for 
succeeding when their intentions were to do well than they were for 
succeeding when their intentions to perform were less positive than 
those of their classmates. The students were considered to be less 
responsible for failing when their intentions to do well exceded those 
of the other students in the class than they were for failing when they 
were less concerned about doing a good job than the other students in 
the class. 
The outcome of the event had a significant effect upon the 
ratings of responsibility across all three levels of intent, but the 
magnitude of the effect varied across the three levels. Differing 
outcome produced the greatest effect for above average degree of intent 
to perform and produced the smallest effect for below average degree of 
intent to perform. The powerful outcome effect was most apparent when 
the child was described as being much less intent on doing a good job 
than most of the other students in the class, and the child was con-
sidered to be more responsible for passing than for failing. When the 
child was described as being about as intent on doing a good job as 
most of the other students in the class, the child was considered to 
be more responsible for succeeding than the child with below average 
intent and less responsible for failing than the child with below 
average intent. When t he child was described as being much more intent 
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on doing a good job than most of the other students in the class, the 
child was considered to be much more responsible for succeeding than the 
students with average or below average intentions and was considered to 
be much less responsible for failing than the average and below average 
intentioned students. 
Thus it can be seen that if a teacher perceives a child to be 
more intent on doing a good job than most of the other students in the 
class then the teacher will believe that something outside of the 
students control must have contributed to the failing grade. In such a 
case the child can not be held responsible to a considerable degree for 
the failure. Similarly, if a child was as .intent on doing a good job 
as most of the other students in the class, the failure is somewhat 
unexpected and must have been the result of outside factors, to at 
least some extent. However, the child who was not particularly intent 
on doing a good job may be seen as one whose poor attitude had some 
causal contributing effect on the failure, and is thus more responsible 
for the failure than were other children who may have failed. The 
puzzling fact that "low intention" pupils who succeed are judged more 
responsible than those who fail is not readily explicable. It may be 
that success per se is more important in influencing the perceived 
responsibility for an outcome than is degree of intention, when the 
intention cue manipulated is regarding success. It would be interesting 
to see what the effects of intention to fail might be in this situation. 
In the case of success, it is clear that increased levels of positive 
intentions served to increase the teachers' beliefs about the responsi-
bility of the child for the outcome. 1·lhen considering the child with 
an above average intent to perform the teacher can be certain that the 
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child in a sense caused the outcome while successes from a child who was 
minimally motivated may have come from other chance sources in addition 
to the effects caused by the child. 
Effort x Outcome Effects 
The results of this study indicated that the relative level of 
effort of the student in the stimulus stories significantly affected 
the ratings of responsibility for both passing and failing outcome. 
Students were considered to be less responsible for their failures than 
they were for their successes, but in both cases the teachers discrimi-
nated the amount of effort expended by the students and considered the 
effort of the child when making a decision about whether the child was 
responsible for the final result. 
Children were held most responsible for succeeding when their 
effort was greater than most of the other students in the class. 
Children were held least responsible for failing when their effort was 
greater than most of the other students in the class. Thus the child 
who demonstrated above average effort was considered to have caused, 
or at least contributed substantially, to the success; whereas, a 
child who put forth above average effort but failed was not held 
responsible for that failure. The failure was believed to rest outside 
the child's control and responsibility. 
Children who demonstrated an average degree of effort were held 
less responsible for their success than were their above average 
counterparts. It may be that since the teachers believe they must 
provide the structure and instruction necessary to ensure success, a 
passing grade for a child who has put forth average effort was per-
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ceived as partly due to the child's performance and partly due to the 
teacher's preparation. Therefore, while the child who put forth average 
effort can and was held accountable or responsible for achieving a 
passing grade the child has not contributed as much to the success as 
his above average effort classmate. Children who demonstrated average 
effort were held less responsible for their failures than for their 
successes. It appears that if the child has put forth at least as much 
effort as the average child in the class then the teacher would have 
expected the child to succeed. The lack of success may then be attribu-
ted to factors outside of the child such as the difficulty of the 
assignment or to other chance factors. 
Children who demonstrated below average effort were considered 
to be least responsible for succeeding at the task and most responsible 
for failing. That is, a child who put forth less effort than most of 
the other students in the class was not considered to have affected the 
success or to be responsible for it to the same extent that other 
children did. Children with below average effort who passed were con-
sidered to be less responsible for the result than were children who 
put forth average effort but failed. Perhaps, if the teachers assume 
that they have given assignments that are appropriate for all children, 
then it would follow that no child should pass unless they put forth a 
certain expected degree of effort. If a child does succeed who has not 
shown effort then that child is not considered to be responsible for 
the successful result. Instead, some other chance factors such as 
prior experience, good guessing or perhaps even cheating are perceived 
to be at the root of the success. The child who does not demonstrate 
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the level of effort shown by most of the other students in the class is 
considered to be more responsible for the failure than the average 
effort child was for a success. Thus if a child does put ·forth some 
effort and succeeds some of the responsibility for the success is 
attributed to the child while some may be attributed to outside factors 
including the teacher, but if the child does not seem to put forth 
effort and fails then a greater proportion of the responsibility remains 
with the child. 
Differential Effects of Intention and Effort 
on Responsibility Ascriptions 
The most important aspect of these results is the greater magni-
tude of effects for effort cues than for intention cues on ascriptions 
of ca~sal responsibility. This finding is in direct opposition with 
the predictions based upon Heider's theory. It appears that intention 
is not the primary determinant of causal responsibility but that effort 
is the more important attributional cue. Thus teachers look to infor-
mation from the effort variable to decide the cause of and the locus of 
responsibility for the outcome. It may be that intention is perceived 
to have some role in the final outcome by the influence that it exerts 
upon effort. That is, good intentions can have an effect on the amount 
of effort that an individual expends and thus, indirectly play some 
role in the assignment of causal responsibility. However, because 
effort has a more direct effect upon the outcome its influence on 
ascriptions of responsibility are much greater. 
In addition, the differential effects of intention and effort 
that were found for evaluative judgments were reflected in related 
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differential effects on responsibility ascriptions. The decreasing 
trend in ascriptions of responsibility for success from above average 
level of effort and intent to the average level of these variables was 
enhanced as effort decreased from average to below average but was 
diminished as intention decreased from average to below average. 
Similarly, in the case of negative outcome the increasing trend in 
ascription of responsibility for failure that accompanied decreasing 
levels of effort was enhanced as the level of effort moved from average 
to below average while the increase in the ascription of responsibility 
for failure that accompanied a decrease from above average to average 
intention was diminished beyond the point of average intent. 
There are a number of hypotheses that could be generated from 
the various elements of attribution theory to explain aspects of the 
results obtained for responsibility ascriptions. It could be suggested, 
for example, that children are considered to be responsible for those 
events over which they had control or for which they had freedom to 
alter the outcome. If low effort was perceived to be more readily 
alterable by the teachers themselves than low intent, then it might be 
expected that those same teachers would hold children more responsible 
for failure based upon low effort than for failure based upon poor 
intentions. However, a more comprehensive and empirically plausible 
explanation for the responsibility data parallels one put forth for the 
. 
evaluation data. That is, the differential effects of intention 
information and effort information are based upon certainty of 
inference. Teachers can be more certain that observations of low effort 
were valid than that inferences of low intent were valid. Thus 
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teachers could be free to utilize the cues of below average effort but 
be inhibited in their use of inferences of low intent when ascribing 
responsibility or determining the source of blame for the failure. This 
certainty of inference may also be related to beliefs about actual 
causal power. That is, although a low level of intent to perform could 
affect an outcome through some indirect means (i.e., influencing effort) 
low effort could be considered more causal in the sense that it could 
have a direct effect on the outcome, and thus be more responsible for 
the observed failure. Such an hypothesis, once again, leads to a view 
of "intent" and "effort" as variables at different levels of abstract-
ness, the latter being more directly observable. 
The results obtained here showed somewhat different effects for 
intention cues and effort cues on ascriptions of responsibility. Thus, 
while these two factors can not be shown as yet to be clearly distinct, 
they can no longer be treated as equivalent. Future research and 
theoretical endeavors must take these findings into account and attempt 
to clarify their meaning. 
Relationship Between Evaluative Judgments 
and Responsibility Ascriptions 
Attribution theory is built upon the premise that ascriptions of 
responsibility organize causal attributions and thus directly affect 
evaluative judgments. It has been suggested that when responsibility 
for an event is assigned to an individual, the evaluations of the 
individual would be more extreme than when responsibility for an event 
does not rest with the individual being evaluated. It would make sense 
than an observer would be more neutral in evaluation of individuals who 
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are not responsible for the event being evaluated. One would expect 
that an observer would be more positive toward someone who was con-
sidered responsible for affecting a positive event than toward someone 
who was not responsible. Likewise, it is reasonable that an observer 
would be more negative in their evaluation of someone considered to be 
responsible for a negative event than toward someone who was not held 
responsible for the negative event. Although responsibility ascriptions 
are considered to be a primary link between an event and its evaluation, 
the systematic empirical examination of the relationship between 
responsibility ascription and achievement evaluation has not been 
extensive. One of the purposes of this study was to examine the 
relationship between the ascriptions of responsibility made for a series 
of achievement related stories and the evaluative judgments of the same 
stories for elementary school teachers. 
It is assumed that the assignment of causal responsibility is at 
the root of the evaluative process. Thus it would be expected that 
responsibility ascriptions and evaluative judgments would be systemati-
cally related. The relationship between responsibility ascriptions and 
evaluative judgments could take a number of forms. Such a relationship 
could be found in the degree of responsibility attributed by teachers 
to a student for a particular event and the specific evaluation given 
to the student for that event. Second, it is possible that the 
relationship between responsibility ascriptions and evaluations could 
be found between the degree to which an individual holds others in 
general to be responsible for events and the extremeness of the indi-
vidual's evaluations. Thirdly, the relationship could involve parallel 
effects upon the utilization of the various classes of causal cues in 
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the evaluative process and in responsibility ascription. The data 
indicated that there was no meaningful relationship between the degree 
of responsibility attributed by a subject to a child in a specific story 
and the actual evaluation by the subject to that story. That is, for 
each story, the differences between subjects in the assignment of 
responsibility ratings did not parallel the differences between subjects 
in the extremeness of evaluations. The absence of a significant cor-
relation between evaluation and responsibility ascription may be 
related to the scales used to gather the two dependent measures. It is 
possible that within any given story, the range of responses on the 
scale of evaluations and particularly the range of responses on the 
scale of responsibility ascriptions may have been too restricted. For 
example, if the subjects in the sample were grouped around a single 
responsibility rating for any given story then the range of scores would 
be too restricted to permit a correlation to be found. For that reason, 
correlations were also calculated across stories for the four separate 
between-subject groups. There was, however, no meaningful relationship 
found between a subject's general tendency to hold the children 
responsible and that subject's tendency to give extreme evaluations. 
Since evaluations were not correlated with responsibility ascriptions 
the hypotheses put forth by Heider and Weiner were not supported. 
The results of this study are perplexing in that despite the 
absence of a correlation between individual differences in responsi-
bility ascriptions and evaluative judgments, there was a strong simi-
larity between the pattern of manipulated effects found for responsi-
bility ascriptions and the pattern of manipulated effects found for 
evaluative judgments. That is, while individual differences between 
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subjects in how responsible they held pupils for an event failed to pre-
dict individual differences in evaluative extremeness (and vice versa), 
there was a strong parallel found between the manner in which subject's 
responses on these two dependent measures were affected by the infor-
mational cues presented (Rho= .850). Thus, individual differences in 
how responsible teachers hold pupils for events and how extremely they 
evaluate them appear to be largely determined independently. Yet the 
more sensitive measure of relationship between these two variables -
the correlation between how subjects altered their judgments according to 
the cues manipulated - revealed that the bvo judgment systems are at 
least partl y based upon parallel rule systems. Even the high rho value 
of .850 obtained is probably an underestimate of the degree of relation-
ship here, since only five of the 24 instances in which a difference in 
ranks of 10 or more (out of a total of 72) involved a judgment of a 
rank lower than 30. 
Another clue indicating that responsibility ascriptions do 
affect evaluations rather than being independent of them was found in 
the significant effort x order interaction for evaluations. This 
showed that the effects of perceived effort upon evaluations were 
magnified when responsibility was judged prior to the evaluations being 
made. No interactions of order with any other variable were found for 
the responsibility judgments, however, indicating that the relationship 
does not run the other way (i.e, evaluation influencing responsibilit y ). 
In addltion, the comments made by teachers on the data forms 
and information obtained through discussions with teachers about 
situations that arise in a classroom certainly indicate that a student's 
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responsibility for an outcome is ver y cogent to them when they are con-
sidering how to evaluate the student. Such naturalistic observations 
in conjunction with the strong parallel in treatment effects of 
responsibility ascriptions and evaluative judgments shows that further 
investigation in this area is required, perhaps by directl y manipulating 
each t ype of judgment as an informational cue to see its affect on the 
other. 
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CoricTusiori 
A number of questions were addressed in this study. The two 
primary issues involved the differential utilization of motivational 
cues in the attribution and evaluation process, and the relationship 
between responsibility ascriptions and evaluations. An additional 
aspect of the investigation was the examination of the role of the 
situational variable locus of outcome consequence in the evaluation of 
achievement behavior. 
The results indicated that both intention cues and effort cues 
influenced teachers' evaluations of students. Different patterns were 
found for intention effects than for effort effects. The results also 
indicated that both intention cues and effort cues affected ascriptions 
of responsibility. Different patterns were found for intention effects 
than for effort effects, with the patterns of evaluation and responsi-
bility ascription being very similar. Several explanations of these 
results were presented including differences in attribution of responsi-
bility, differences in the certainty of teachers' inferences, and 
differences in teachers' expectancies. The soundest alternative for 
interpreting the results is one that is contradictory to Reider's (1958) 
differentiation of the role of intent cues as opposed to the role of 
effort cues, and is instead more in keeping with the suggestions made 
by Ryan (1970). That is, it appears that effort is the primary moti-
vational cue for ascribing responsibility and thus for reaching an 
evaluative judgment. Intention is secondary in its degree of utiliza-
tion, particularly if not supported by effort information. Intention 
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is likely to be the more "derived" or abstract judgment, more closely 
linked to inferred integrations of behavior than to the facts available 
to an observer, and thus less trusted as an empirical criterion for 
responsibility ascription and evaluation than is effort. Both motiva-
tional cues, however, are operative on such judgments. 
The correlations between responsibility ascriptions and evalua-
tive judgments between individuals for the various conditions were not 
significant. There were, however, indications in the results and from 
comments made by teachers that decisions regarding the responsibility 
of students do affect their evaluations of students, In addition, the 
pattern of effects from the various classes of information were highly 
parallel for both responsibility ascriptions and evaluative judgments. 
It is essential that mediational activity of responsibility ascriptions 
in the evaluation process be examined in greater detail. 
Suggestions from previous research regarding the effects of 
locus of outcome consequence in the evaluation process were not sup-
ported by the results of the current study. It appears that there is a 
need for the systematic analysis of this variable in the . context of a 
number of different school related tasks so that the findings of 
attribution studies can be generalized to the natural school environ-
ment. 
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APPENDIX 
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GRADE 
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This is a study of how teachers evaluate the p~rformance of their 
students. When responding to each story, pl ease answer quickly with the 
first impression that you have. In this way the entire task should take 
no more than 20 minutes of your time. 
Thank you very much for your assistance. 
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Individual Task 
You have been working with your students on a particular unit in 
social studies. The unit has been broken down into several specific 
topics. Each student in the class has been assigned one specific topic 
about which to gather information and write a report. The students have 
had three weeks to work on their projects. 
i.rnen you assigned the projects, you informed the students that 
they would be graded on a pass/fail basis according to specific objec-
tive criteria which you outlined. You also informed the students that 
the reports would be returned to them on the Monday following the due 
date. The students were advised that anyone who failed to complete his 
project satisfactorily would have to do additional work in school on 
that Monday to !!lake up for the failure. 
You and several other teachers had been planning a field trip for 
the fourth, fifth and sixth grades, and due to the difficulty of 
coordinating schedules, the only practical date for the trip is the same 
Monday on which your students must make up for failing grades on their 
projects. You, therefore, made arrangements for an aide to remain with 
any students who fail to complete the assignment so that, even if some 
students fail the project, you would be able to take the rest of your 
students on the trip. You have explained these arrangements to all of 
the students in the class. ~he students know that if they receive a 
failing grade on their report, they will have to miss the field trip. 
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Group Task 
You have been working with your students on a particular unit in 
social studies. The unit has been broken down into several specific 
topics. Each student in the class has been assigned one specific topic 
about which to gather information and write a report. The students 
have had three weeks to work on their projects. 
When you assigned the projects you informed the students that 
they would be graded on a pass/fail basis according to specific objec-
tive criteria which you outlined. You also informed the students that 
the reports would be returned to them on the Monday following the due 
date. The students were advised that anyone who failed to complete his 
project satisfactorily would have to do additional work in school on 
that Monday to make up for the failure. 
You and several other teachers had been planning a field trip for 
the fourth, fifth and sixth grades, and due to the difficulty of 
coordinating schedules, the only practical date for the trip is the same 
Monday on which your students must make up for failing grades on their 
projects. You, therefore, made arrangements for an aide to remain with 
any students who fail to complete the assignment so that even if some 
students fail the project, you would be able to take the rest of your 
students on the trip. However, you have just recently learned that an 
aide will not be available on that day. Therefore, if any students fail 
the project, you will have to postpone the trip for all of your students. 
You have explained these arrangements to all of the students in 
the class. The students know that if they receive a failing grade on 
their report, they will have to miss the field trip and that as a 
result, their classmates will have to miss the trip also. 
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Evaluation 
As a teacher, you frequently find yourself in a position of 
making evaluative judgments about your students. At times you may be 
quite pleased by a particular student's behavior, at other times you may 
be quite displeased, and at other times your evaluation may be so~ewhere 
between these two extreme points. 
Place yourself in the situation presented on the following pages. 
Please read carefully each of the descriptions of a student's behavior 
and respond as you actually do with students in your class. Indicate 
your reaction to each child's behavior by using the alternative choices 
printed beneath each story. Pluses indicate that you are pleased by 
the child's behavior and minuses indicate that you are displeased. Five 
pluses would mean that you are very pleased; one plus would mean that 
you are minimally pleased. Five minuses would mean that you are very 
displeased; one minus would mean that you are minimally displeased. 
Please select an answer for every story and clearly mark only 
one choice for each. If you have any comments about the specific 
stories, please feel free to include them in the space provided. 
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Responsibility 
.As a teacher you frequently find yourself in a position of 
making a judgment about a student's personal responsibility for an 
event. That is, you must decide whether a student can be held account-
able for the outcome of the event. At times you may feel that a 
student is definitely responsible for the outcome; at other times you 
may feel that the child is not at all responsible for the outcome; and 
at other times your feelings about a child's responsibility may lie 
somewhere between these two points. 
Place yourself in the situation presented on the following pages. 
Please read carefully each of the descriptions of the student's behavior 
and respond as you actually do with students in your class. Indicate 
your reaction to each child's behavior by using the alternative choices 
printed beneath each story. If you feel that the outcome definitely is 
not the personal responsibility of the child, you would circle alterna-
tive 1. If you feel that the outcome definitely is the personal 
responsibilit y of the child, you would circle alternative 5. 
Please select an answer for every story and clearly mark only one 
choice for each. If you have any comments about the specific stories, 
please feel free to include them in the space provided. 
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111 
Dan is generally capable of an average level of achievement in 
all of his work. From statements that he has made to you and to several 
of his classmates, you inferred that he was much more intent on doing a 
good job on this project than were most of the other students in the 
class. From the amount of time he spent both gathering information and 
writing the paper, you have determined that he put much more effort into 
his project than did most of the students in the class. 
On the basis of the objective criteria which you had specified, 
Dan's report clearly should be rated as a "pass". He will not have to 
do additional work for this unit, and he will be able to go on the field 
trip. 
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Jim is generally capable of an average level of achievement in 
all of his work. From statements that he has made to you and to several 
of his classmates, you inferred that he was much more intent on doing a 
good job on this project than were most of the other students in the 
class. From the amount of time he spent both gathering information and 
writing the paper, you have determined that he put much more effort into 
the project than did most of the students in the class. 
On the basis of the objective criteria which you had specified, 
Jim's report clearly should be rated as a "fail". Jim will have to do 
additional work for this unit, and as a result, he will be unable to go 
on the field trip. 
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Joan is generally capable of an average level of achievement in 
all of her work. From statements that she has made to you and to 
several of her classmates, you inferred that she was much more intent on 
doing a good job on this project than were most of the other students in 
the class. From the amount of time she spent both gathering information 
and writing the paper, you have determined that she put about as much 
effort into her project as did most of the students in the class. 
On the basis of the objective criteria which you had specified, 
Joan's report clearly should be rated as a "pass". Joan will not have 
to do additional work for this unit, and she will be able to go on the 
field trip. 
122 
Carol is generally capable of an average level of achievement in 
all of her work. From statements that she has made to you and to 
several of her classmates, you inferred that she was much more intent 
on doing a good job on this project than were most of the other students 
in the class. From the amount of time she spent both gathering informa-
tion and writing the paper, you have determined that she put about as 
much effort into her project as did most of the students in the class. 
On the basis of the objective criteria which you had specified, 
Carol's report clearly should be rated as a "fail:i. Carol will have to 
do additional work for this unit, and as a result, she will be unable 
to go on the field trip. 
128 
131 
Lisa is generally capable of an average level of achievement in 
all of her work. From statements that she has made to you and to 
several of her classmates, you inferred that she was much more intent on 
doing a good job on this project than were most of the other students in 
the class. From the amount of time she spent both gathering information 
and writing the paper, you have determined that she put much less effort 
into her project than did most of the students in the class. 
On the basis of the objective criteria which you had specified, 
Lisa's report clearly should be rated as a "pass". Lisa will not have 
to do additional work for this unit, and she will be able to go on the 
field trip. 
132 
Ann is generally capable of an average level of achievement in 
all of her work. From statements that she has made to you and to 
several of her classmates, you inferred that she was much more intent on 
doing a good job on this project than most of the other students in the 
class. From the amount of time she spent both gathering information and 
writing the paper, you have determined that she put much less effort 
into her project than did most of the students in the class. 
On the basis of the objective criteria which you had specified, 
Ann's report clearly should be rated as a "fail' 1 • Ann will have to do 
additional work for this unit, and she will be unable to go on the field 
trip. 
129 
211 
Allan is generally capable of an average level of achievement in 
all of his work. From statements that he has made to you and to several 
of his classmates, you inferred that he was about as intent on doing a 
good job on this project as were most of the other students in the 
class. From the amount of time he spent both gathering information and 
writing the paper, you have determined that he put much more effort into 
his project than did most of the students in the class. 
On the basis of the objective criteria which you had specified, 
Allan's report clearly should be rated as a 11pass 11 • Allan will not have 
to do additional work for this unit, and he will be able to go on the 
field trip. 
212 
Joe is generally capable of an average level of achievement in 
all of his work. From statements that he has made to you and to several 
of his classmates, you inferred that he was about as intent on doing a 
good job on this project as were most of the other students in the 
class. From the amount of time he spent both gathering information and 
writing the paper, you have determined that he put much more effort into 
his project than did most of the students in the class. 
On the basis of the objective criteria which you had specified, 
Joe's report clearly should be rated as a "fail". Joe will have to do 
additional work for this unit, and as a result, he will be unable to go 
on the field trip. 
130 
221 
Tim is generally capable of an average level of achievement in 
all of his work. From statements that he has made to you and to several 
of his classmates, you inferred that he was about as intent on doing a 
good job on this project as were most of the other students in the 
class. From the amount of time he spent both gathering information and 
writing the paper, you have determined that he put about as much effort 
_into his project as did most of the students in the class. 
On the basis of the objective criteria which you had specified, 
Tim's report clearly should be rated as a "pass". Tim will not have to 
do additional work for this unit, -and he will be able to go on the field 
trip. 
222 
Bob is generally capable of an average level of achievement in 
all of his work. From statements that he has made to you and to several 
of his classmates, you inferred that he was about as intent on doing a 
good job on this project as were most of the other students in the 
class. From the amount of time he spent both gathering information and 
writing the paper, you have determined that he put about as much effort 
into his project as did most of the students in the class. 
On the basis of the objective criteria which you had specified, 
Bob's report clearly should be rated as a "fail 0 • Bob will have to do 
additional work for this unit, and as a result, he will be unable to go 
on the field trip. 
131 
231 
Tom is generally capable of an average level of achievement in 
all of his work. From statements that he has made to you and to several 
of his classmates, you inferred that he was about as intent on doing a 
good job on this project as were most of the other students in the class. 
From the amount of time he spent both gathering information and writing 
the paper, you have determined that he put much less effort into his 
project than did most of the students in the class. 
On the basis of the objective criteria which you had specified, 
Tom's report clearly should be rated as a "pass". Tom will not have to 
do additional work for this unit, and he will be able to go on the field 
trip. 
232 
John is generally capable of an average level of achievement in 
all of his work. From statements that he has made to you and to several 
of his classmates, you inferred that he was about as intent on doing a 
good job on this project as were most of the other students in the 
class. Frora the amount of time he spent both gathering information and 
writing the paper, you have determined that he put much less effort into 
his project than did most of the students in the class. 
On the basis of the objective criteria which you had specified, 
John's report clearly should be rated as a "fail". John will have to do 
additional work for this unit, and as a result, he will be unable to go 
on the field trip. 
132 
311 
Kathy is generally capable of an average level of achievement in 
all of her work. From statements that she has made to you and to 
several of her classmates, you inferred that she was much less intent on 
doing a good job on this project than were most of the other students in 
the class. From the amount of time she spent both gathering information 
and writing the paper, you have determined that she put much more effort 
into her project than did most of the students in the class. 
On the basis of the objective criteria which you had specified, 
Kathy's report clearly should be rated as a "pass". Kathy will not have 
to do additional work for this unit, and she will be able to go on the 
field trip. 
312 
Janet is generally capable of an average level of achievement in 
all of her work. From statements that she has made to you and to 
several of her classmates, you inferred that she was much less intent on 
doing a good job on this project than were most of the other students in 
the class. From the amount of time she spent both gathering information 
and writing the paper, you have determined that she put much more effort 
into her project than did most of the students in the class. 
On the basis of the objective criteria which you had specified, 
Janet's report clearly should be rated as a "fail". Janet will have to 
do additional work for this unit, and as a result, she will be unable to 
go on the field trip. 
133 
3,.,, .t...J.. 
Karen is generally capable of an average level of achievement in 
all of her work. From statements that she has made to you and to 
several of her classmates, you inferred that she was much less intent on 
doing a good job on this project than were most of the other students in 
the class. From the amount of time she spent both gathering information 
and writing the paper, you have determined that she put about as much 
effort into her project as did most of the students in the class. 
On the basis of the objective criteria which you had specified, 
Karen's report clearly should be rated as a "pass". Karen will not have 
to do additional work for this unit, and she will be able to go on the 
field trip. 
322 
Sharon is generally capable of an average level of achievement in 
all of her work. From statements that she has made to you and to 
several of her classmates, you inferred that she was much less intent. on 
doing a good job on this project than were most of the other students in 
the class. From the amount of time she spent both gathering information 
and writing the paper, you have determined that she put about as much 
effort into her project as did most of the students in the class. 
On the basis of the objective criteria which you had specified, 
Sharon's report clearly should be rated as a "fail". Sharon will have 
to do additional work for this unit, and as a result, she will be unable 
to go on the field trip. 
134 
331 
Beth is generally capable of an average level of achievement in 
all of her work. From statements that she has made to you and to 
several of her classmates, you inferred that she was much less intent on 
doing a good job on this project than were most of the other students in 
the class. From the amount of time she spent both gathering information 
and writing the paper, you have determined that she put much less effort 
into her project than did most of the students in the class. 
On the basis of the objective criteria which you had specified, 
Beth's report clearly should be rated as a "pass". Beth will not have 
to do additional work for this unit, and she will be able to go on the 
field trip. 
332 
Debra is generally capable of an average level of achievement in 
all of her work. From statements that she has made to you and to 
several of her classmates, you inferred that she was much less intent on 
doing a good job on this project than were most of the other students in 
the class. From the amount of ti.~e she spent both gathering information 
and writing the paper, you have determined that she put much less effort 
into her project than did most of the students in the class. 
On the basis of the objective criteria which you had specified, 
Debra's report clearly should be rated as a 11fail 11 • Debra will have to 
do additional work for this unit, and as a result, she will be unable 
to go on the field trip. 
